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TRINKO AND RE-GROUNDING THE REFUSAL TO DEAL DOCTRINE 
Adam Candeub· 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 
("Trinko"), I the most important Supreme Court antitrust review of the refusal 
to deal antitrust doctrine in twenty years, pitted a local incumbent monopolist 
telephone company ("ILEC"), Verizon,2 against a class of competitive local 
exchange companies ("CLECs"), the new entrants to local telephone service 
spawned by the 1996 Telecommunications Act ("1996 Act" or "Telecom 
Act"), and their customers.3 The Supreme Court rejected the CLECs' claim 
that Verizon violated the antitrust laws by failing to provide interconnection 
services as the Act required. The CLECs based their claim upon two antitrust 
doctrines: "refusal to deal" and "essential facilities,'''' both of which require 
monopolists to provide vital vertical inputs to their downstream competitors. 5 
Here, the input was interconnection or "access" on a wholesale level to 
Verizon's telephone network that its competitors needed in order to provide 
retail phone service.6 The Court ruled that if a legal mechanism exists, as with 
the 1996 Act, to compel access to the putative monopolist's resource, the 
refusal to deal doctrine has nothing to remedy and, therefore, plaintiffs did not 
state an antitrust claim. 7 
... Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks to Spencer Waller and 
Steve Wildman for their valuable insights; all errors are my own. Thanks to Julie Taiber and H. W. Candeub 
for their support and editing. 
I. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
2. ILECs include the regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), which were the original seven 
local telephone services created by the break-up of AT&T in 1983. The original seven-Ameritech, Bell 
Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and US West have combined, through 
various mergers, into BellSouth, Qwest, SBC, and Verizon. See HARRy NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM 
DICTIONARY 6 (20th ed. 2004). These companies are often referred to as the "Baby Bells." 
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
4. See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOYENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'II 77lb, at 171 (2d ed. 2000); id. 'II 772b, at 176. 
5. [d. 'II 771, at 171 (stating "the essential facility claim is about the duty to deal of a monopolist"). 
6. [d. ("Understanding the 'vertical' nature of essential facility claims helps to focus the analysis: 
the essential facility claim is about the duty to deal of a monopolist who is able to supply an input for itself 
in a fashion that is so superior to anything else available."). 
7. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 
(stating no access is required ''where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel sharing and 
to regulate its scope and terms") (quoting 3A AREEDA& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 'II 773C, at 150). 
821 
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How lower courts interpret Trinko will have a determinative impact on all 
network and communications industries. Given the lukewarm success of the 
Telecommunications Act and the Federal Communications Commission's 
(FCC) efforts to foster local telephone competition, the antitrust laws may be 
the only effective method for competitive telephone networks to guarantee 
access to the Baby Bells' networks.8 Naturally, Trinko will be influential in 
the CLECs' ongoing suits predicated on different antitrust theories other than 
refusal to deal.9 Beyond telephony, the Court's ruling could have a huge 
impact in the countless simmering disputes in network industries, ranging 
from Internet broadband access and the open cable system debates to the 
satellite and electricity industries. 10 
8. Most industry commentators consider that the Act has failed in its effort to create vibrant local 
competition. See, e.g., Don't Blame Telecom Act; Blame Its Enforcement, TELECOM POL'y REp., Aug. 4, 
2004, at 30 (setting forth the argument of Vincent Cerf, designer of the IP protocol and one of the "fathers 
of the internet," who blames the "failure" of the Act on its implementation), available at 2004 WL 
67005979; David S. isenberg, The End of the Middle: Pushing Network Intelligence out to Its Edges Is 
Causing the Phone Industry To Fail-and That's Okay, IEEE SPECTRUM, Jan. 1,2003, at 37,37 (calling 
the Act an "utter failure"), available at 2003 WL 13280190. Legal commentators tend to agree. See, e.g., 
Reza Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecommunications Act To Blame?, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (2003) ("Seven years after the passage of the Act, it is regretfully safe to posit that 
the telecommunications field is in total disarray."); J. Gregory Sidak, Remedies and the Institutional Design 
of Regulation in Network Industries, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REv. 741, 755 ("European regulators in 
Brussels and London with whom I have met do not regard the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as a 
success, and they do not want to emulate it."); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory 
of Wireless Communication, 82 TEx. L. REv. 863, 962 n.417 (2004) (noting the "general failure of the 
'unbundling' requirements of the 1996 Telecommunications Act"). 
9. See, e.g., Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050-52 (11th Cir. 
2004) (allowing an antitrust "price squeeze" suit to continue); Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC 
Communications, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 5J3 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (same). 
10. The disputes include the "open access" debates in cable systems, which involve whether cable 
systems must open their networks to programmers, as well as the Bells' continuing obligation to 
interconnect with competing internet service providers. The FCC's efforts to "close" the cable systems, see 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 
(2002) (Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) [hereinafter High-Speed Declaratory 
Ruling], have been recently upheld by the Court. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). The FCC has recently issued fmal orders on telephone interconnection with 
DSL-provided broadband concluding that mandatory interconnection is not required. See Press Release, 
Federal Communications Commission, FCC Eliminates Sharing Requirement on Incumbents' Wireline 
Broadband Internet Access Services (Aug. 5, 2005); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) [hereinafter 
Broadband Access NPRM]. 
Scholarly debate on the issue has been intense. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 
(2001); JOHN B. MORRIS, JR. & JERRY BERMAN, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., THE BROADBAND 
INTERNET: THE END OF THE EQUAL VOICE? (2000), available at http://www.cdt.org/publicationsl 
broadbandandinternet.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); ACLU, No COMPETITION: How MONOPOLY 
CONTROL OF THE BROADBAND iNTERNET THREATENS FREE SPEECH (2002), available at http://www.aclu. 
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This article argues that the Court's opinion is at times at odds with a large 
body of widely accepted economic theory-as well as the plain language of 
the 1996 Act's saving clause. Trinko's implication that there can be no 
antitrust injury from refusing to deal, i.e., provide interconnection, so long as 
regulation requires access, is probably not true. In other words, the Trinko 
opinion could potentially immunize from antitrust scrutiny whole swathes of 
anticompetitive behavior. 
Beyond Trinko, this article examines the refusal to deal doctrine and the 
antitrust theory on which the Court ruled, and offers a re-interpretation of the 
doctrine. Rather than view the doctrine as merely protecting competitors and 
competition, not consumer welfare, this article maintains that the doctrines are 
meant to prevent vertical foreclosure, which under certain conditions can have 
negative consumer welfare implications. Vertical foreclosure is, broadly 
speaking, the strategy of a dominant firm in one market to exclude competitors 
from another market by refusing to sell them a bottleneck good. II Antitrust 
authorities, particularly prominent figures in the "Chicago School" of antitrust 
orglissueslcyberlNoCompetition.pdf(last visited Mar. 1,2005); Antonia M. Apps & Thomas M. Dailey, 
Non-Regulation 0/ Advanced Internet Services, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 681 (2000); Earl W. Comstock & 
John W. Butler, Access Denied: The FCC's Failure to Implement Open Access to Cable as Required by 
the Communications Act, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 5 (2000); Harold Feld, Whose Line Is it Anyway?: 
The First Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23 (2000); Rob Frieden, 
Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison 0/ the 
Traditional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. LJ. 207 (2003); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open 
Internet Access and Freedom o/Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TuL. L. REv. 87 (2000); Mark 
A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End 0/ End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture 0/ the Internet in the 
Broadband Era, 48 UCLAL. REv. 925 (200 I) [hereinafter Lemley & Lessig, End-to-End}; Mark A. Lemley 
& Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 WHmlER L. REv. 3 (2000) [hereinafter Lemley 
& Lessig, Open Access]; Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A 
Case Study o/the AOLlFime Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001); James B. Speta, 
Unbundling and Open Access Policies: The Vertical Dimension o/Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. 
REv. 975 (2000); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 
19 Y ALEJ. ON REG. 171 (2002); HeatherT. Hendrickson, Comment, Cable Open Access: The FCC Should 
Establish a National Policy o/Staying Out o/the Way o/Broadband Competition, 8 GEO. MAsON L. REv. 
749 (2000); Marcus Maher, Comment, Cable Internet Unbundling: Local Leadership in the Deployment 
o/High Speed Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 211 (1999); Christopher K. Ridder, Note, AT&T Corp. v. City 
of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Ore. 1999), 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 397 (2000); Jason Whiteley, 
Note & Comment, AT&T Corp v. City of Portland: Classifying the "Internet over Cable" in the "Open 
Access" Fight, 2000 BYU L. REv. 451, 455-83; David Wolitz, Note, Open Access and the First 
Amendment: A Critique o/Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 4 YALE 
SYMP. L. & TECH. 6 (200 I). The issue is vital in other network industries like satellite communications. 
See Kenneth Katkin, Cable Open Access and Direct Access to INTELSAT, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 77 
(2002). 
II. Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure I, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION ill (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds.). 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 824 2004-2005
824 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:821 
scholarship, have largely disparaged vertical foreclosure as a theory of 
antitrust harm, 12 and its scope has been dramatically curtailed, largely because 
the harm it is intended to prevent has seemed unlikely to occur: firms will not 
accept temporary losses in sale (by refusing to sell to competitors) in order to 
achieve some long-term market dominance in a vertically related market--or, 
as Justice Scalia might say, to pursue "dreams ofmonopoly.,,13 
Recent economic theory suggests, however, that exclusion may allow the 
bottleneck owner to enhance its monopoly power in its existing market (as 
opposed to its downstream market). 14 This, in turn, allows the monopolist to 
enhance its monopoly rents (i.e., raise prices to a supra-competitive level) in 
its existing monopoly by precluding potential competition. Such a strategy 
might decrease total social welfare-clearly an antitrust injury. IS This article 
concludes that in network industries, with incumbent monopolists possessing 
significant market power on the wholesale and retail level, vertical foreclosure 
is a serious concern, and Trinko must be read to allow antitrust law to 
adjudicate such claims. 
Finally, the Trinka Court's implication that a dominant firm's refusal to 
interconnect cannot present an antitrust violation, provided such firm is 
regulated, is refuted by the most significant telecommunications antitrust 
decisions of recent history. The Execunet decision,16 which helped to create 
the competitive long distance industry and, of course, the Modified Final 
Judgment,17 which brought about the break-up of AT&T, both found 
anticompetitive behavior even though the monopolist and its interconnection 
obligations were regulated. 
Section I examines the key critiques of the refusal to deal and essential 
facilities doctrines. It classifies the critiques according to the three types of 
efficiencies that economics generally recognize: allocative, productive, and 
12. Fredorick R. Warren-Boulton, The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Analysis of 
Non-Horizontal Mergers, available at http://www.usdoj.Gov/atrlhmerger/11709.htm( .. TheChicagoschool 
has provided theoretical and empirical evidence of how every form of vertical control can be the optimal 
instrument to achieve efficiencies. "). 
13. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 
(2004). 
14. See Rey & Tirole, supra note II, at 6. 
15. The article accepts the "consensus ... [that] antitrust should be viewed as 'a consumer welfare 
prescription.' Under this interpretation, a practice restrains trade, monopolizes, is unfair, or tends to lessen 
competition if it harms consumers by reducing the value or welfare they would have obtained from the 
market-place absent the practice." Thomas G. Krattenmaker et aI., Monopoly Power and Market Power 
in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. LJ. 241, 244 (1987). 
16. MCl Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
17. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
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dynamic. The section concludes that while these critiques are strong, they are, 
like most economic arguments, limited in their application. The section points 
out those instances in which they would not hold, suggesting a possible 
application of the antitrust laws. 
Section II examines Trinko's primary antitrust legal holding-that, as a 
matter oflaw, neither the refusal to deal nor essential facilities doctrines apply 
to goods sold pursuant to a regulatory mandate. It discusses the doctrines and 
their status in both Supreme Court precedent and legal and economic 
commentary. The section points out that the Trinko decision relied upon a 
bare logical deduction: if access is the remedy that the refusal to deal and 
essential facilities doctrines provide, and if existing law or regulation already 
requires access, then the refusal to deal and essential facilities doctrines have 
no role to play, because there is no injury.18 Remedies have already been 
granted. This reasoning, though possessed of certain dogmatic force, begs the 
question: do refusals to interconnect, whether made pursuant to regulatory 
mandate or not, constitute an anticompetitive injury, which would seem to be 
the basic issue presented in Trinko. 
Section ill examines the conditions under which a refusal to deal should 
constitute an antitrust violation and whether the facts of Trinko might satisfy 
such conditions. Severely criticized by commentators and treated with disdain 
by the Trinko court, the refusal to deal doctrine does rest on uncertain 
economic and legal grounds. Relying on recent economic research, this 
section reinterprets the doctrine, suggesting that refusals to interconnect could 
be part of an anticompetitive strategy of vertically foreclosing competition. 19 
While commentators have recognized these doctrines' vertical nature,20 they 
have failed to characterize them as foreclosure by a firm with market power 
in two vertically related markets. 
Finally, Section IV returns to the central concern that motivated the 
Trinko Court: that the judiciary would be unable to administer or prescribe 
effective remedies under the refusal to deal and essential facilities doctrines, 
tasks presumably more suitable to an administrative agency.21 Given the 
18. Trinko, 540 U.s. at 409 ("The specific nature of what the 1996 Act compels makes this case 
different from Aspen Skiing [the leading refuse to deal precedent]."); id. at 41 I ("[T]he indispensable 
requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of access to the 'essential facilities'; where access 
exists, the doctrine serves no purpose."). 
19. As discussed infra, a dominant player in a network industry can vertically integrate and refuse 
to interconnect as one strategy in retaining monopolist rents. 
20. See supra note 6. 
21. Trinko, 540 U.S. at414 (stating that "conduct consisting of anti competitive violations of § 25 I 
[of the I 996 Act] may be, as we have concluded with respect to above-cost predatory pricing schemes, 
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decision's weak, legalistic grounds-which are at tension with the 1996 Act's 
plain language-the Trinko Court's true motivation arguably lies in these 
policy/prudential concerns which, in fact, constitute a significant bulk of the 
opinion.22 
Contrary to the Trinko Court's fear of court-mandated interconnection,23 
Section IV points out that judges have been quite competent at creating 
interconnection regimes, most notably Judge Greene's break-up of AT&T that 
mandated interconnection between the local telephone companies (the 
"ILECs" and "Baby Bells"), which produced a vibrant, competitive long-
distance industry.24 This article argues that success in mandating successful 
interconnection does not depend on the institution Gudicial or administrative) 
that sets the terms for interconnection. Both the judicial and agency decision-
making processes have their strengths and weaknesses. Successful mandating 
of access depends more on the type of interconnection mandated. Looking to 
the Coasian theory of the firm and the field of transaction cost economics, and 
its elaboration and specification by Oliver Williarnson,25 the article argues that 
interconnection can be successfully mandated if such interconnection has 
governance costs that are relatively low-in other words, it is relatively simple 
and would be efficient to be performed between firms using market 
mechanisms. 
I. AGAINST THE REFUSAL TO DEAL DOCTRINE 
Antitrust law prohibits acts of monopolization or attempts to 
monopolize.26 Modem economic understanding of illegal monopolization 
concludes that merely having a large market share does not make an economic 
actor an illegal monopolist. As has been pointed out on countless occasions, 
a corporation's possession of large market share does not necessarily mean 
'beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control''') (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993». 
22. Id. at 411-17. 
23. The Court feared that the judiciary might be unable to craft remedies, requiring "antitrust courts 
to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing." Id. at 408. 
24. Gerald Faulhauber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications Experiments, IS 
INFO. ECON. & POL'y 73 (2003). 
25. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, The 
Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTNES 171 
(2002). 
26. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAw OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK § 3.la, 72 (2000) (citing IS U.S.C. § 2 (2000». 
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that it is either charging monopolistic rates or behaving in a manner that 
decreases social welfare, the touchstone of economists' (and most antitrust 
lawyers') definition of optimal behavior.27 
The key evidence to determine whether an actor is monopolizing is 
whether it has market power to raise prices above a competitive level, reduce 
output, and exclude competition (thus monopolize) and thereby presumably 
cause consumer welfare loss or decreased net social welfare.28 Since the 
Alcoa case, at least, antitrust cases have generally involved a definition of the 
market and an evaluation of whether the putative monopolist behaves as a 
monopolist within that market.29 Therefore, under modem approaches, 
antitrust liability generally requires at least two distinct findings: (i) an actor 
has market powe~o and (ii) the actor deliberately has followed a course of 
market conduct by which it has obtained or maintained power to control price 
or exclude competition.3l 
With origins pre-dating the modem economic justification of antitrust 
policy,32 the leading refusal to deal case, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp.,33 as well as most refusal to deal and/or essential facilities 
cases,34 allows plaintiffs to engage in a more straightforward, arguably 
simplistic analysis of whether the conduct is anticompetitive. According to 
Aspen Skiing, refusal to deal requires a dominant firm to continue to deal with 
a competitor (i) when doing so would enhance consumer welfare, (ii) this 
welfare enhancement is known to the monopolist, and (iii) there is no 
27. I AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ~ 110, at 95 ("[E]conomic concerns have generally 
dominated antitrust policy . . . . The biggest advantages conferred by the use of relatively traditional 
microeconomics as the guiding principle for antitrust are two: coherence and welfare."); id. ~ 112d, at 130 
("We might all agree that economic efficiency and consumer welfare should be dominant or perhaps even 
exclusive as antitrust policy concerns."); see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE ~ 2.3c, at 74 (2d ed. 1999). 
28. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 26, § 3.3, at 86. 
29. Id. at 87. 
30. A monopolist need not have market power. Consider the local grocery in a small rural town in 
France in which no one has cars. The grocery has a monopoly on local groceries. Given the ease of entry, 
however, it lacks market power to raise its prices above a competitive level. 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. E.1. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
32. The Supreme Court has never accepted the "essential facilities" doctrine, see Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004), and the case most 
closely associated with both the essential facilities and refusal to deal doctrines, United States v. Terminal 
Railroad Ass 'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), was decided nearly a century ago. 
33. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
34. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. I (1945); Terminal R.R. Ass 'n, 224 U.S. at 383. 
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efficiency justification for the refusal. 3S As Trinko took pains to establish, the 
refusal to deal doctrine is an exception to the general rule that absent an 
intention to create or retain a monopoly, firms are free to deal with whomever 
on whatever conditions.36 
Aspen Skiing involved the ski areas of the famed resort town of Aspen, 
Colorado. The town had four mountains, three of which were owned by the 
petitioner/defendant, Aspen Skiing, and the fourth was owned by the 
respondent/plaintiff, Aspen Highlands. For many years, the two companies 
offered a joint, mUltiple-day, all-area ticket. After repeatedly demanding an 
increased share of the proceeds from the sale of such tickets, the defendant 
cancelled the joint ticket arrangement. The plaintiff tried to recreate the joint 
ticket, even, in effect, offering to buy the defendant's tickets at retail price.37 
The Court ruled that Aspen Skiing's refusal was an attempt "to exclude rivals 
on some basis other than efficiency" and therefore illegal under section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. 38 
Similarly, the essential facilities doctrine involves refusals to deal in 
access to some "bottleneck facility," which is generally defined as some input 
that competitors could not realistically duplicate. The essential facilities 
doctrine states that, under certain circumstances, a refusal to deal is subject to 
a monopolization claim under section 2 ofthe Sherman Act. For instance, in 
United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n o/St. Louis,39 the case cited for the 
origin of the essential facilities doctrine,4o the Court required a coalition of 
railroad operators, dominated by "robber baron" Jay Gould, that owned a key 
bridge across the Mississippi River to allow non-members to use this 
"essential" bridge.41 
Under MCl Communications Corp. v. AT&T, usually identified as the 
most significant modem explication of the doctrine, the essential facilities 
35. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 26, § 3.4b, at 116. It was stipulated that Aspen Skiing was a 
monopolist. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
36. [d.; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
37. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 594. 
38. [d. at 605. 
39. 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
40. As the Trinka opinion pointed out, the Supreme Court has never recognized it, although some 
of the circuits have. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 411; see also JOINT COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
AsSOCIATION'S SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WAND SECTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND PRACTICE ON THE REpORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT 
OF JAPAN 3 (2004) ("The United States Supreme Court has made clear that it has never recognized the 
essential facilities doctrine, and it recently declined the opportunity to endorse or repudiate the doctrine. "); 
id. at 5 ("The essential facilities doctrine arguably is derived from [Terminal Railroad Ass 'n]."). 
41. Terminal R.R. Ass 'n, 224 U.S. at 384-85. 
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four-part test requires a showing of"( 1) control ofthe essential facility by the 
monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate 
the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; 
and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility. '>42 As mentioned above, the 
Supreme Court never has recognized this doctrine and declined to rule on it 
in Trinko, but support for the doctrine is generally believed to be found in the 
Terminal Railroad case discussed supra.43 
Commentators generally disapprove of both doctrines.44 Herbert 
Hovenkamp states that the essential facilities doctrine is "one of the most 
troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman § 2 
liability.'>45 As Areeda and Hovenkamp state, "using § 2 against arbitrary 
refusal to deal . . . has a superficial appeal . . . . [Y]et we are largely 
unpersuaded that § 2 should be applied here." 
The judicial and academic hostility stems from the theoretical difficulty 
of seeing how mandating sales between firms will necessarily decrease prices 
for consumers or increase consumer or overall social welfare. In other words, 
remedies under the refusal to deal doctrine may not further economic 
efficiency but may simply regulate more competitors into existence. The 
Supreme Court apparently accepted this conventional wisdom, stating, "We 
have been very cautious in recognizing [refusals to deal as illegal] because of 
the uncertain virtue of forced sharing. ,,46 
One can organize the arguments made against these doctrines into three 
main categories of efficiency that economists generally deal with: 
(i) allocative efficiency, meaning the greatest output, given the market's sum 
total of willingness to pay; (ii) productive efficiency, meaning using the most 
cost effective inputs to produce a given product; and (iii) dynamic efficiency, 
42. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d \081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1982); see also 
Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing To Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1177, 1207 (2002). 
43. Similarly, the essential facilities doctrine is not terribly well grounded and never has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court. See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting 
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1989); see also Trinka, 540 U.S. at 411 ("We have never 
recognized [the] doctrine [of essential facilities]."); 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1\ 772b, at 
176 ("The Supreme Court has never articulated or approved the modem version of the essential facility 
doctrine.") (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,428 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
44. See, e.g., 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1\ 770e, at 167 ("[U]sing § 2 against 
arbitrary refusals to deal ... has a superficial appeal ... [y]et we are largely unpersuaded that § 2 should 
be applied here."); id.1\77lc, at 173 ("Lest there be any doubt, we state our belief that the essential facility 
doctrine is both harmful and unnecessary and should be abandoned.") (citing Areeda, supra note 43)). 
45. HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 7.7, at 305. 
46. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. 
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meaning the rate of introduction of new products and improvements in 
existing ones.47 
As shown below, the weight of legal scholarship contends that neither 
doctrine furthers any of these efficiency goals. But, the arguments typically 
relied upon are incomplete. The following identifies the arguments used 
against the refusal to deal doctrine as well as the limits of each argument. In 
Section ill, we will examine arguments that refusals to deal can, in fact, 
impose social welfare loss and, therefore, can constitute antitrust violations. 
A. Allocative Inefficiency of the Refusal to Deal Doctrine 
Forcing firms to deal with each other, even when one of the firms is a 
monopolist, clearly would improve the welfare of the monopolist's 
competitors. They would have some input which, without the deal, would be 
presumably very expensive to reproduce. But, it is less clear whether 
requiring a firm to deal with competitors would improve consumer welfare, 
i. e., consumers would not receive lower prices but more firms would simply 
divide the monopoly rents they received. Consider an example: A court could 
order the Baby Bells to sell access to competitors, but if the access price were 
at monopolistic levels, competitors would likely pass on the monopolistic 
prices to consumers. Therefore, consumers would not benefit. Conversely, 
the Baby Bells could sell at non-monopolistic rates to the competitive entrants, 
but the competitive entrants possibly could continue to charge high rates to 
consumers, essentially splitting monopolistic rents in some sort of duopolistic 
equilibrium. In other words, ifthere is a monopoly problem, the problem is 
with downstream consumer markets, not upstream wholesale markets-which 
are the concern of the refusal to deal and essential facilities doctrines. 
Numerous commentators and judges have made this point in arguments 
against the economic benefits of the refusal to deal and/or the essential 
facilities doctrines. Chief Judge Posner, in Blue Cross & Blue Shield United 
of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic,48 rejected the claim that a doctor-owned 
clinic with an affiliated HMO should be forced to accept other HMOs. Posner 
ruled that even if, in fact, the doctor-owned clinic did constitute a natural 
monopoly (the clinic served rural Wisconsin and, thus, arguably could be a 
natural monopoly), forcing it to deal with non-affiliated HMOs would not 
provide cheaper fees or better service for health care consumers. He states: 
47. Luis M.B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 26-27 (2000). 
48. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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Consumers are not better off if the natural monopolist is forced to share some of his 
profits with potential competitors .... Similarly, if the practice of medicine in some 
sparsely populated county of north central Wisconsin is a natural monopoly, consumers 
will not be helped by our forcing the handful of physicians there to affiliate with multiple 
HMOs. Those physicians will still charge fees reflecting their monopoly.49 
In other words, if a natural monopoly exists, it should be regulated as such, 
with a regulatory agency setting prices. Mandating access does not help 
consumers. 50 Areeda and Hovenkamp have also made this argument. 51 
In a related argument, Professor Glen Robinson points out that much 
competition is "rivalrous," i.e., firms compete for a limited pool of business 
and take business from each other. A broad duty to deal would threaten to 
outlaw such competition, clearly a result that seems unacceptable from a 
common sense viewpoint. 52 In more economic terms, a firm could gain market 
share at the expense of another firm by withholding some input, but the total 
output and price level would remain constant, a condition that Robinson calls 
the "classic illustration of the zero-sum character of rivalrous competition"53 
Admittedly, the allocative efficiency benefits of the refusal to deaV 
essential facilities doctrines are not immediately clear. Critics would seem to 
be correct that if sharing simply results in the splitting of monopoly profits 
between firms, antitrust enforcement would be a waste. However, what the 
mainstream criticism does not consider is to what degree refusals to deal could 
constitute defense of an existing monopoly. In this sense, refusal to deal is a 
strategy whereby the monopolist retains its monopoly by vertically integrating 
into a downstream market. Forced access, therefore, would not have the effect 
of sharing monopoly rents, but possibly destroying monopoly as the new 
entrants force prices to competitive levels. It is this possibility that Section ill 
will examine in detail. 
49. Id. at 1413. Commentators have applied this insight to the deregulatory efforts of the 1996 Act. 
See John T. Soma et aI., The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated Telecommunications 
Industry, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 565, 613 (1998) ("Simply allowing access to copper telephone delivery 
systems without invocation of the essential facilities doctrine enables a competitor to substitute itself for 
the incumbent local exchange provider. This substitution has limited pro-competitive effects .... "). 
50. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1221 
(1999) ("It bears emphasis, nonetheless, that the judicial intervention produced no obvious benefit from the 
standpoint of competition or consumer welfare. If there is a mechanism by which monopoly rents can be 
extracted by the user-owners of an essential facility ... it is difficult to see how changing the number of 
competitors would alter the distortion."). 
51. 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 11 770e, at 169-71. 
52. Robinson, supra note 42, at 1198-99. 
53. Id. at 1198. 
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B. Productive Efficiency 
Productive efficiency refers to using the most cost effective inputs, or 
combinations and proportions of inputs, to produce a given product. 54 As with 
allocative efficiency, it would seem that the refusal to deal and essential 
facilities doctrines do not further productive efficiency and may, in fact, lessen 
it. In other words, in most circumstances, forcing a firm, particularly a natural 
monopoly, to share inputs with a competitor does not make for greater 
efficiency, but rather adds to the total cost of production. 
The most basic argument that the refusal to deal and/or essential facilities 
doctrines cannot further productive efficiency is somewhat tautological. A 
"natural monopoly," which has a theoretical, mathematical explication, by 
definition involves a market that is most efficiently served by one firm. 55 For 
instance, it was widely believed that local telephone service was a natural 
monopoly. 56 It makes no sense to allow two firms to provide such service 
because there would have to be two separate networks of telephone poles and 
copper wire loops into homes--clearly a wasteful result, or so it was often 
thought. The same service could be better provided by one network. 
Modem critics of the refusal to deal and essential facilities doctrines do 
not concentrate on the productive efficiency of a natural monopoly. This is 
probably because the concept of a natural monopoly is only clear in economic 
theory and whether one, in fact, exists is difficult to show.57 Rather, they 
point out that any judicial remedy under either doctrine often turns into a 
bureaucratic, administrative nightmare, requiring judges or agencies to set 
prices and mandate the terms of access. 
If judges and agencies do a poor job of regulating access, their 
burdensome, bureaucratic, and wasteful schemes of access will inflict 
additional expense and cost on all firms, both monopolist ones and new 
entrants. These costs, of course, would be passed on to consumers, thereby 
creating productive inefficiency, rather than furthering it.58 For instance, 
Lipsky and Sidak state that "the essential facilities doctrine . . . requires 
54. CABRAL, supra note 47, at 26-27. 
55. See generally WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1982) (setting 
forth the conditions under which a natural monopoly might exist). 
56. ld. at 23. 
57. ld. 
58. Robinson, supra note 42, at 1216 (noting that "one should not assume that placing regulators 
in charge is always a reliable solution"). 
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extensive judicial regulation of monopoly conduct .... The salient policy 
question is whether courts ... are competent to identify natural monopolies 
and formulate and administer regulatory schemes capable of enhancing 
welfare."59 Indeed, the 1996 Act is, arguably, a good example of the 
questionable effectiveness of a legally mandated sharing. After eight years, 
the FCC has failed to produce a legal system of access and has instead 
furthered a disastrous $50 billion telecom boom and bust in local 
telecommunications.60 
The risk that the refusal to deal doctrine could impose productive 
inefficiencies is magnified by the particular legal test associated with it-a 
test adopted in Aspen and continued by Trinko. Both cases require that the 
court or agency look to the motivation for whether the refusal to deal is 
anticompetitive.61 In other words, courts often mandate access if they divine 
an anticompetitive intent to exclude competition on grounds "other than 
efficiency"-and, as critics point out, this is hardly a rigorous standard. 62 
Indeed, as Robinson notes, the standard, if uniformly and mechanically 
applied, would virtually outlaw rivalrous competition.63 Further, it turns on 
difficult questions of determining business motivations.64 
Admitting that a poorly planned program of access can impose excessive 
cost simply to support competitors, there are examples of mandated access 
59. Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 50, at 1223. 
60. This point was recently made by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated the 
Commission's Triennial Order "in light of the Commission's failure, after eight years, to develop lawful 
unbundling rules, and its apparent unwillingness to adhere to prior judicial rulings." United States Telecom 
Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Of course, the failure of the Commission to come up 
with "lawful ... rule" is not unrelated to the rulings of the court of appeals. 
61. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,409 
(2004) ("Here, therefore, the defendant's prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of its refusal to 
deal--upon whether its regulatory lapses were prompted not by competitive zeal but by anticompetitive 
malice. The contrast between the cases is heightened by the difference in pricing behavior. "); Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 385, 610 (1985) ("[T]he evidence supports an inference 
that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns. "). 
62. Judge Easterbrook has made this point quite eloquently: 
[A jggressive, competitive conduct by a monopolist is highly beneficial to consumers. Courts should 
prize and encourage it under the antitrust laws. Aggressive, exclusionary conduct by a monopolist 
is deleterious to consumers. Courts should condemn it under the antitrust laws. There is only one 
problem. Competitive and exclusionary conduct look alike. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying ExclUSionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 972, 981 (1986). 
63. Robinson, supra note 42, at 1209-12 (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield 
Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1995». Robinson does defend the essential facilities doctrine in 
cases where there are essential facilities and either a possibility that leveraging might occur or doubt as to 
whether the essential facility is naturally monopolistic. Id. at 1213. 
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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that have worked in telecommunications. For instance, the FCC's 
deregulation of customer premise equipment ("CPE" a!k/a phone sets) in the 
1970s,65 the Computer III regulations that allowed for independently owned 
dial-up ISPs in the 1990s,66 which played a pivotal role in the widespread 
deployment ofthe Internet, or, perhaps more controversially, the introduction 
of long-distance competition in the 1980s.67 
This inarguable historical precedent suggests that the typical criticism of 
the essential facilities/refusal to deal doctrine misses the mark. Sometimes 
mandated interconnection introduces productive inefficiencies; other times it 
does not. As will be further examined in Section N, transaction cost 
economics may hold the key for distinguishing cases in which productive 
efficiency would be furthered from those in which it would be diminished. In 
a nutshell, according to transaction cost economics, market-based 
transactions-as between two interconnecting firms-feature "high-powered 
incentives. ,,68 Such interconnecting firms are under constant pressure to lower 
costs and improve output, but such firms face high costs in governing such 
market-based transactions (i.e., market transactions create risks that 
investment in asset-specific products may not be fully recovered).69 On the 
other hand, integrated firms face lower governance costs, but face lower 
incentives to cut costs and adopt more efficient ways of doing business. 
65. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision). 
66. Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's Computer Inquiries, 
55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167,204 (2003) ("The Computer m Final Order was released in 1986. The first 
commercial ISP was established in 1989. The Commercial Internet eXchange was set up in 1991 as the first 
exchange point for traffic between commercial Internet backbones (such traffic was not permitted on the 
NSFNET) .... The success of the Internet was clearly the result of the confluence of forces [including] ... 
[the commission having] deregulated the Customer Premise Equipment market (i.e., modems)."). 
67. See generally GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICA nON POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE: 
FROM MONOPOL YTOCOMPETITION (1994) (describing the bureaucratically led development of competition 
in aspects of the once completely regulated AT&T monopoly); Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, 
Modularity, Vertical Integration and Open Access: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation 
in the Internet Age, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 85, 130 (2003) ("Of the actions taken in the Computer 
Inquiries, Computer II's open access rules, which facilitated competition in customer premises equipment, 
were the most successful and enduring. "). 
68. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GoVERNANCE 66-67 (1988). 
69. According to Williamson, some transactions require one party to invest significantly in 
transaction-specific resources, for instance, a large IT contractor would invest heavily in developing a 
specific computer system for a particular customer oflittle worth to others. Such products require extensive 
"governance," i.e., the IT contractor must ensure that the customer will not shirk on its obligation to pay 
once the investment has been made, and the customer must ensure that the IT contractor does not shirk in 
doing its job. Such a contract is to be compared with the purchase of commodities in a market in which 
none of these problems appear. See id. at 62-67. 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 835 2004-2005
2005] TRINKO AND REFUSALS TO DEAL 835 
Transaction cost economics suggests that it is far from clear a priori in 
any given situation whether the market-based high incentives and the 
associated governance costs of market-based transactions will be more' 
efficient than integrated, intra-firm transactions despite such transactions' 
typically lower costs. Section IV will examine how and why mandated access 
seems to further productive efficiency in some instances-and hinder it in 
others. 
C. Dynamic Efficiency 
Dynamic efficiency refers to the speed at which innovative technologies 
are introduced.70 Commentators criticize both the refusal to deal and essential 
facilities doctrines for lessening dynamic efficiency in two ways. First, by 
requiring a firm to deal with or share its facilities with a competitor, the 
regulator decreases the incentives to create new and/or innovative 
replacements for the original monopolist's resource.71 For instance, it could 
be argued that if the FCC mandates access to the local telephone loop, such 
a mandate would decrease the incentive to use alternatives for telephone 
connection, such as the cable system or wireless. 72 
In a similar vein, Glen Robinson points out that an unfettered duty to deal 
with competitors would outlaw rivalrous competition-in which a firm seeks 
to maximize its profits at the expense of rivals.73 As Robinson points out, 
economists like Joseph Schumpeter see competition as a process of "creative 
destruction. ,,74 Every firm wants to be a monopolist and will seek new and 
better methods to knock off existing monopolists and take their places. Firms 
. in constant conflict and those not cooperating advance dynamic efficiency. 
If the antitrust laws do not require cooperation, firms will be able to extract 
70. CABRAL, supra note 47, at 21. 
71. 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 'U 77lb, at 171-72 ("Forcing a finn to share its 
monopoly ... [does not make] consumers ... better off ... and discourages finns from developing their 
own alternative inputs."); id. 'U 77lc, at 173-74 ("[S]haring the monopoly does nothing to restore output 
and price to competitive levels."); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 
1406, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the essential facility doctrine has been criticized as having 
"nothing to do with antitrust principles," for "[ c ]onsumers are not better off if the natural monopolist is 
forced to share some of his profits with potential competitors"). 
72. Indeed, this is the typical argument against "unbundling." 
73. Robinson, supra note 42, at 1197. 
74. Id. at 1180-81 (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
84-92 (3d ed. 1950)). 
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greater monopoly rents-and thus provide other firms with greater incentives 
to replace them with more efficient technologies and processes. 
Dynamic efficiency arguments are notoriously difficult to assess, and, not 
surprisingly, neither form of the dynamic efficiency anti-essential facilities/ 
refusal to deal doctrines is a slam-dunk. First, it is indisputa\)le that sharing 
facilities diminishes the incentive to create alternatives. However, this is only 
a problem if alternatives, which are similarly priced and/or efficient, exist or 
are likely to be created given the current state of knowledge and technology. 
For instance, in Terminal Railroad, the essential facilities were the only 
geographically feasible bridge over the Mississippi River in the St. Louis area. 
Alternatives to such a resource-say commercial airfreight-were not likely 
to be created at virtually any cost, certainly not in the early twentieth century. 
Thus, requiring sharing of the crossing facility was not likely to diminish 
dynamic efficiency in the short run or the long run. 
Other related forms of this Schumpeterian argument-that existing 
monopolists have the greatest incentive to introduce innovations because they 
can most easily reap their rewards-also lack universal acceptance. 
Numerous theoretical models, such as Kenneth Arrow's, suggest the opposite, 
and the empirical evidence is mixed.75 In sum, very little can be said 
definitively about dynamic efficiency. The bald claim that refusal to deal and 
essential facilities doctrines will decrease dynamic efficiency, therefore, 
simply cannot be accepted as true in all cases, or even in most cases. 
Beyond variations of the Schumpeterian argument, critics also maintain 
that the refusal to deal/essential facilities doctrine decreases dynamic 
efficiency in another way: it reduces the incentive of incumbent monopolists 
to invest in new facilities because the sharing requirement will decrease the 
return on such facilities. The FCC has adopted this argument with almost 
zombie-like acquiescence in numerous proceedings,76 and the D.C. Circuit and 
75. See KENNETH J. ARRow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention, in 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RIsK-BEARING 144 (1971) (forwarding model in which deconcentrated market 
produces greatest investment in innovation); see also Y 00, supra note 10, at 276-77 (reviewing literature 
on dynamic efficiency and describing its results as "inconclusive"). 
76. The FCC relied on this argument heavily in the Cable Modem Order and Wireline Broadband 
DSL. See High-Speed Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10, at 4879 (questioning whether multiple ISP access 
would decrease investment in high-speed Internet lines); Broadband Access NPRM, supra note 10, at 3032 
("It appears that broadband facilities support an ever-increasing variety and number of services and 
applications. As a result, a provider's decision to invest in redundant transmission facilities may be based 
on fundamentally different assumptions than those a provider relied upon in the past. "). 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837 2004-2005
2005] TRINKO AND REFUSALS TO DEAL 837 
the Supreme Court have both relied upon this argument. 77 In a recent article 
that is discussed further below, Professor Elhauge goes so far as to ask: 
[O]nce we admit ex ante efficiencies [those dealing with the incentives to invest], 
couldn't any monopolist always say it had a "valid" efficiency justification for refusing 
to share its property rights with its rivals? ... The monopolist would merely have to 
observe that its refusal to deal with rivals must increase its overall expected profits in 
some way ... [and] confer the efficiency benefit of increasing ex ante incentives to 
create, enhance, or maintain the valuable property that confers the monopoly power. 78 
Of course, reducing the level of return (due to sharing requirements) reduces 
the incentives to invest, at least marginally. Yet, the argument is incomplete 
because it does not tell you how much decrease in investment you will see. 
The magnitude of the decrease depends upon numerous factors, perhaps most 
significant of which is the opportunity costs of the dominant firm. If those 
costs were lower than profits under a system of mandatory access, then one 
would expect little decrease in investment and little decrease in allocative 
efficiency. 
Finally, numerous scholars, most notably Professors Mark Lemley, 
Lawrence Lessig, and Brett Frischmann, have argued that open networks 
foster innovation and dynamic efficiency.79 They argue that the decentralized 
nature of open networks facilitates intellectual exchange and fosters creativity 
on a broad scale. As a powerful example, they point to the "end-to-end" 
architecture of the Internet, which is an open system, that clearly exhibits 
numerous positive externalities and public benefits. This would suggest, 
contra Schumpeter, that open, non-integrated firms provide dynamic 
efficiency benefits. 
D. Conclusion & Prologue 
It must be conceded that the refusal to deal doctrine has an ambiguous 
effect on efficiency. If remedies based on refusal to deal claims merely split 
monopoly rents, then one does not improve allocative efficiency but merely 
divides rents. If, on the other hand, forced sharing counters a strategic 
77. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
78. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REv. 253, 306 (2003). 
79. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, AN ECONOM!C THEORY OF INFRASTRUCfURE AND SUSTAINABLE 
INFRASTRUCTURE COMMONS (Sept. 8,2004), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=588424; Lemley & 
Lessig, End-to-End, supra note 10, at 957-63 (maintaining that the "end-to-end," decentralized nature of 
the internet spurs innovation). 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 838 2004-2005
838 UNIVERSITY OF PITfSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:821 
behavior like vertical foreclosure, preventing monopolists from gaining full 
rents, then it could improve allocative efficiency. If the system of access or 
forced dealing is too burdensome, wasteful, or bureaucratic, it would inflict 
productive efficiency costs-but not all such systems necessarily do so, as the 
historical record with telephones would suggest. Finally, little can be said 
with surety concerning dynamic efficiency. 
The Trinko Court had the problem of ruling on the refusal to deal and 
essential facilities doctrines, both of which provide remedies of ambiguous 
economic benefit. Most commentators see little value in either doctrine, yet, 
at the same time, qualify their arguments with crucial caveats. Given the 1996 
Act's saving clause, the Court had to decide whether a refusal to deal 
constitutes an antitrust violation even in a regulated context. The next section 
describes and critiques the reasoning the Court used to arrive at its result. 
II. THE TRINKO OPINION 
A. The Facts and the Legal Problems They Presented 
Trinko was a customer of a CLEC, the local telephony division of 
AT&T.80 Trinko claimed that Verizon failed to offer AT&T "access to the 
local loop on a par with [Verizon's] own access" and, therefore, injured the 
CLECs and their customers. 8 I Trinko argued that, just as it was 
anti competitive for the Aspen Highlands Company to refuse to deal with the 
Aspen Skiing Company for tickets, it was anti competitive for Verizon to deny 
access to its facilities to the CLEC.82 In Aspen Skiing, Aspen Skiing had the 
opportunity to make money with j oint tickets and gave up that opportunity to 
presumably damage Aspen Highlands Company. Trinko argued that Verizon 
similarly had the opportunity to rent portions of its network to its CLEC but 
failed to do so for anticompetitive motives. In a nutshell, the Court first 
concluded that nothing in Verizon's alleged behavior indicated 
anticompetitive intent and, therefore, Verizon "does not fit within the limited 
exception recognized in Aspen Skiing" to the general rule that parties may 
"freely exercise [their] own independent discretion as to parties with whom 
[they] will deal.,,83 Further, because there was an existing regulatory process 
80. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 404 
(2004). 
81. Brief for Respondent at 16, Trinko (No. 02-682), available at 2003 WL 21767982. 
82. [d. at 5-9. 
83. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919». 
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for obtaining access, the Court could remedy nothing, and the refusal to deal 
and the essential facilities doctrines did not apply. 
The Court in the Trinko case was faced with numerous difficulties. First 
and foremost, it had to deal with a doctrine for which there is no definitive 
economic rationale and which has the clear potential for providing inefficient 
remedies. Second, the Court faced the judicially administrative nightmare of 
the antitrust laws being used to enforce the 1996 Act, a potential "perfect 
storm" of litigation disaster. The Court has already reviewed the 1996 Act 
twice, once on jurisdictional grounds84 and another on statutory 
(Administrative Procedure Act) grounds, producing two long, difficult, and 
technical opinions.85 The Court will perhaps review aspects of the Act yet 
again, for its most recent opinion left crucial constitutional takings issues 
unanswered.86 The rules under which the 1996 Act provides access were still 
being challenged in the courts at the time of the Trinko ruling-and were 
vacated a few months after Trinko was handed down.87 The notion that on top 
of all of this legal (and consequently business) uncertainty, the Court would 
add another litigation possibility of antitrust claims to enforce the Act seems 
unthinkable. As a final complicating factor, the 1996 Act, as discussed above, 
contains a saving clause that explicitly states that nothing in it would limit or 
preclude the application of the antitrust statutes.88 Thus, the statute itself 
seems to invite further application of the antitrust laws and explicitly 
precludes the straightforward legal solution: that the 1996 Act preempts or 
supersedes the antitrust laws. 
In order to successfully navigate this perfect storm, the Court had to find 
that there was no antitrust injury under the facts pled. This, of course, feeds 
back to the first problem-no one is quite sure what type of antitrust injury the 
essential facilities and refusal to deal doctrines are meant to remedy. 
B. Trinko's Legal Reasoning 
The Court's legal analysis was straightforward. First, the Court stated 
that although it would have liked to rule that the Act preempted the antitrust 
84. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-94 (1999). 
85. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 496 (2002). 
86. Id. at 523-24. 
87. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
88. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 143 ("Except 
as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be 
construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws."). 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 840 2004-2005
840 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:821 
law, it could not do so because of the saving clause.89 Second, and most 
important, it then proceeded to examine whether the facts presented 
represented a cognizable claim under the refusal to deal doctrine. This 
analysis took up the bulk of the opinion and concluded that a monopolist that 
refused to deal in a good mandated by regulation cannot violate section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. 
1. The Saving Clause 
The first part of the opinion dealt with the Act's saving clause, which 
states "the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy existing antitrust 
standards.,,90 Justice Scalia concluded that the saving clause stated that the 
antitrust laws should apply to telecommunications despite the 1996 Act's 
regulations and, therefore, they must. The Court, however, commented 
ruefully that "the enforcement scheme set up by the 1996 Act is a good 
candidate for implication of antitrust immunity, to avoid the real possibility 
of judgments conflicting with the agency's regulatory scheme.,,91 The Court 
noted the Act "does not create new claims that go beyond existing antitrust 
standards,,,92 and then spent the rest of the opinion showing how the facts as 
pled in Trinko did not constitute an antitrust harm. 
It seems worth speculating on how the saving clause affected the Court's 
analysis. A straightforward interpretation of the Act would allow dual 
enforcement, a policy result that the Trinko Court apparently found repugnant. 
The refusal to deal doctrine as it existed before Trinko arguably would have 
allowed the suit. Indeed, three of the four courts of appeal, having less 
authority than the Supreme Court to read new requirements into the refusal to 
deal doctrine, had read the saving clause to permit antitrust suits alleging 
refusal to deal or essential facilities-type conduct-with only one dissenting 
circuit.93 In order to avoid this unfortunate policy result (the "perfect storm" 
89. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406. 
90. Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Compare Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 
2002), rev'd sub nom. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004), MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. U.S. West Communications, 325 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated 
sub nom. Qwest Corp. v. MetroNet Servs. Corp., 540 U.S. 1147 (2004), superceded and withdrawn sub 
nom. MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) (ruling that the saving clause 
allowed antitrust suits on the essential facilities or refusal to deal grounds), and Covad Communications 
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (1IthCir. 2002), vacated by540U.S. 1147 (2004), with Goldwasser 
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of litigation described above), the Court had to find that the facts as pled did 
not constitute an antitrust violation-and thus was forced into making several 
questionable economic claims.94 
While the Court viewed additional judicial oversight of local telephone 
interconnection unnecessary and wasteful, Congress's fairly obvious 
preference for dual enforcement of the FCC and the antitrust laws is not 
absurd, untenable or "unnecessary." Institutional arrangements, biases, and 
power relations are central to telecommunications policy, and dual oversight 
could well have been necessary to ensure a workable access system, at least 
in Congress's judgment. For instance, during the arduous and fervid debate 
and lobbying preceding passage of the 1996 Act, AT&T wanted the Act to 
require Department of Justice approval for the Baby Bells' entrance into long 
distance, not that of the FCC.95 Congress could quite reasonably have wanted 
the antitrust laws to enforce its access regime because, for better or worse, the 
FCC, structurally incapable of Olympian detachment from political influence, 
could be seen as a poor forum to decide such disputes. Or, at the very least, 
Congress could have intended the threat of antitrust action to discipline the 
behavior of the Baby Bells. 
v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000) (ruling that !LEC's refusal to interconnect did not 
constitute conduct actionable under refusal to deal/essential facilities). Most commentators also criticized 
the Goldwasser decision and argued that the saving clause permitted Trinko's antitrust claims. See Steven 
Semeraro, The Antitrust-Telecom Connection, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (2003); Philip J. Weiser, 
Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. I (2003). 
Student-written commentary agreed with the professorial. See, e.g., Megan Delany, The Dominos of 
Goldwasser: Only Congress Can Stop the Toppling Effect Before the Game Is Over, 10 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 279 (2002). 
94. On the other hand, keeping Congress from making mistakes seems to betray a sort of"Mr. Fix-it 
Mentality" that views the Court's "mission to Make Everything Come Out Right, rather than merely to 
decree the consequences" of the law-a mentality Justice Scalia has derided in other situations. See Harndi 
v. Rumsfeld, 540 U.S. 507, 628 (2004 )(Scalia, J., dissenting)( criticizing the plurality opinion for adopting 
"an approach that reflects what might be called a Mr. Fix-it Mentality. The plurality seems to view it as 
its mission to Make Everything Come Out Right, rather than merely to decree the consequences, as far as 
individual rights are concerned, of the other two branches' actions and omissions"). 
95. In the tremendous legislative duel between the Baby Bells and AT&T, which preceded the 
passage of the 1996 Act and which, by most accounts, AT&T lost, AT&T proposed that each Baby Bell 
be allowed into the long-distance competition only upon certification by the Department of Justice that 
effective competition existed in each Baby Bell's local market. AT&T's preference for the Department of 
Justice over the FCC shows that institutional arrangements can play an enormous role in determining 
regulatory outcomes. See Policy and Regulation, TELEPHONY, Dec. 18, 1995, 1995 WLNR 4033924; 
Edward Warner, In Preparationfor Vote, House Telecom Bill's Rules Get "Scrubbed", WIRELESS WEEK, 
July 13, 1995, 1995 WLNR 3992959. 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 842 2004-2005
842 UNIVERSITY OF PIITSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:821 
2. Preliminary Points 
Before it reached its analysis that the facts did not present a cognizable 
antitrust injury, the Court made two "throwaway points" that were really not 
part of the opinion's main argument: (i) the Court has always insisted upon 
the right of businesses to conduct business with whomever they chose and (ii) 
forced sharing of facilities decreases the incentives for further investment. 
Neither point added much to the opinion's logical or economic analysis, but 
they appeared to signal the Court's general hostility to the refusal to deal 
doctrine. 
a. Refusal to Deal Is a Limited Doctrine 
The Court repeated that, as a rule, the refusal to deal doctrine is only a 
small exception to the "right of [a] trader or manufacturer ... [to] freely 
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will 
deal. ,,96 Though sentimentally evocative of eighteenth century capitalism or 
nineteenth century small town business, this is not really true. On one hand, 
it is the hallmark of a free economy that individual businesses make their own 
business decisions and, as the Colgate decision made clear, the antitrust laws 
have nothing to do with politically-motivated or other personal motivations for 
business practices.97 
But, the Court forgot the other hand: publicly held corporations have a 
fiduciary duty to maximize profits within the confines of law, including the 
antitrust laws. In competitive markets in which businesses lack market power, 
refusing to deal-turning down an offer to make money-seems odd behavior 
because it reduces revenue. Or, as Areeda and Turner state, "[s]ubstantial 
monopolists, run by directors responsible. to. stockholders, will generally 
behave rationally and make all profitable sales.,,98 Unlike Seinfeld's famed 
Soup Nazi, large, publicly-held corporations cannot turn down business for 
personal, frivolous reasons~r those that do face their shareholders' wrath 
and the market's ineluctable judgment. It is reasonable at least to suspect that 
any plan of refusal to deal could be based on some strategic behavior. Such 
conduct mayor may not violate the antitrust laws, but strategic behavior is, at 
least, a necessary first step to an antitrust violation. 
96. Trinko, 540 U.s. at 408. 
97. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (l919); 3A AREEDA& HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 4, ~ 770d, at 166. 
98. 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ~ 770e, at 169. 
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h. Decrease in Investment 
The Court states a significant concern: forcing a monopolist to share its 
network "may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to 
invest in those economically beneficial facilities.,,99 This argument is widely 
made in a variety of regulatory and legal fora in a variety of contexts, as 
mentioned above. loo It is, in fact, a claim about dynamic efficiency, the 
measurement economists use to see whether resources and investments 
maximize productivity in the long run. lol The argument claims that if 
incentives are not sufficiently high over time, producers of essential facilities 
will not produce them. Or, conversely, if the incentives are greater, essential 
facilities producers will produce more of such products. 
While it is undoubtedly true that a lower return on investment will at least 
marginally decrease such investment, the argument begs the question and, in 
fact, makes questionable assumptions about dynamic efficiency, as discussed 
above. 102 In essential facilities and refusal to deal cases, like Trinko, the 
economic issue is not only the monopolist's incentives but also those of its 
interconnecting competitors. If the essential facility monopolist prices its 
facility in a way that discourages optimum investment, then it may not provide 
the efficient incentives for competitive entrance. In essential facilities cases, 
it is at least plausible that, given the large number of potential users of the 
essential facilities and the great promise of their innovations, i.e., applications 
on the internet, maximizing their incentives would maximize social welfare. 
The dynamic effects of the users of the facility must also be considered-
eliminating their ability to market services, products, and use of the PSTN 
could have negative social welfare consequences. 103 
Further, it is impossible to substantiate the claim that a lower return (due 
to sharing) will necessarily lower net social welfare, at least under the record 
99. Trinko, 540 U.s. at 408; see also 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 'II 77ld, at 172 
(sharing "removes or reduces the plaintiff's incentive to develop its own independent capacity for 
[developing its own facilities]"). 
100. Numerous commentators have made this point as well. See, e.g., James B. Speta, Tying. 
Essential Facilities. and Network Externalities: A Comment on Piraino, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1277 (1999). 
The FCC has also embraced this concern, citing it as a basis in numerous decisions. See supra note 76. 
10 l. CABRAL, supra note 47, at 16. 
102. See supra Part I.C. 
103. See Richard N. Langlois, Technological Standards. Innovation. and Essential Facilities: 
Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 
207 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001). 
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the court had before it. While, as said above, lowered return will marginally 
decrease the Baby Bells' incentive to build, it is not clear how much. As a 
basic postulate of microeconomics, if building facilities with sharing 
obligations provides a return that is greater than costs-including opportunity 
and fixed costs, even the monopolist will build it. 104 In other words, if 
building a facility with sharing obligations will provide more return than any 
use to which Verizon can put its capital, Verizon will build. Sharing will 
decrease incentive to build on the margins, but it does not follow that this 
would constitute total social welfare loss once other effects are counted in. 
Failing to grasp that basic point, the opinion's claims about the nature of 
incentives, investment, and dynamic efficiency are overblown ifnot (from a 
slightly quibbling perspective) erroneous. It states that 
mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, 
is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The 
opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts 
"business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly 
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct. lo5 
Firms will have incentives to invest if the investment's return will exceed its 
cost, including its opportunity costs, i.e., the investment's return will be 
greater than all other available options. The ability to charge monopoly rents 
is not necessarily determinative. 
3. Intent, Anticompetitive Behavior and Trinko 's Economic Analysis 
The Court's central legal and economic analysis relied on Aspen Skiing, 
recognizing the case as the definitive statement of the refusal to deal doctrine 
and distinguishing its facts from Trinko. Initially, the Court stated that the 
refusal to deal doctrine was highly limited and prescribed and reaffirmed the 
firms' freedom to deal with whomever they choose. Then the Court came 
closest to stating an economic test for when a refusal to deal would be an 
antitrust violation. It is the economic heart ofthe opinion. 
104. CABRAL, supra note 47, at IS. 
lOS. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
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In Aspe,n Skiing, the defendant turned down a proposal to sell at its own retail price, 
suggesting a calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be higher. Verizon's 
reluctance to interconnect at the cost-based rate of compensation available under 
§ 251(c)(3) tells us nothing about dreams of monopoly. 106 
The Trinko court saw a refusal to deal as part of a strategy to forsake short-
term profits as a tool to drive out competitors, the "anticompetitive end.,,107 
Because Verizon refused to interconnect at cost-based rates, the Court 
concluded that its behavior could not be anti competitive. This is, in itself, an 
odd rule as it is not clear that any firm would sell at pure cost-based rates, i. e., 
no profits. 
Applying this rule, nonetheless, the Court found three significant ways 
Trinko could be distinguished from Aspen Skiing and concluded that these 
distinctions failed to demonstrate an "anti competitive bent" in V erizon' s 
behavior. 108 First, unlike Aspen Skiing, in which the two firms at one time 
offered joint tickets, Verizon had not engaged in a course of dealing in 
wholesale access until forced to by regulation. 109 Second, in Aspen Skiing the 
putative monopolist turned down the opportunity to deal with its competitor 
at retail prices. In Trinko, Verizon allegedly refused to deal at regulatory set 
prices that were not retail but were wholesale "cost-based," set pursuant to the 
FCC's TELRIC methodology."0 Third, the unbundling elements Verizon 
"rented" to AT&T were "brand new" and never before marketed to the 
public. 111 
This position is somewhat bizarre. It would, in effect, immunize from 
antitrust scrutiny the very greedy monopolist that never deals with competitors 
but would create the risk of antitrust liability for the moderately greedy 
monopolist that deals sometimes with some competitors. The Court also 
created the possibility for strategic behavior, with unhappy allocation 
efficiency results; namely a firm will be reluctant even to deal with 
companies, because if it ever stops doing so, for whatever reason, the Trinko 
rule would raise the specter of antitrust liability. Even more important, this 
106. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 409. 
107. See also Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refosals to Deal in Intellectual 
Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between IP and Other Property Rights, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 741, 781 (2004) (stating "the Trinka Court describes Aspen as relying on a sacrifice-
of-profit test to prove anti competitive intent"). 
108. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 409. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. It should be noted that TELRIC does provide for profit. See infra note 112 and 
accompanying text. 
111. Id. 
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position allowed the Court to avoid the central antitrust question Trinko 
presents-whether a refusal to deal, even under regulated conditions, was 
welfare-enhancing or diminishing. The test it employs for the refusal to deal 
doctrine--can one divine an anti competitive motive in refusing to deal and 
suffering short-tenn loss in favor of long-tenn market dominance-misses a 
possible mode of anticompetitive behavior. As Section ill examines, a refusal 
to deal or exclusionary behavior could be, itself, profit-maximizing by 
allowing the monopolist to continue to charge higher prices in its existing 
monopoly. 
The Trinko Court reasoned, one supposes, that there are a lot more profits 
lost in refusing to deal at retail than at wholesale; therefore, a refusal to take 
retail profits more likely indicates an anticompetitive motivation. Refusals to 
deal at "TELRlC" prices do not reveal such motivation. Intuitively, the Court 
perhaps thought that a refusal to deal at prices that possibly include some type 
of monopoly rents indicate the existence of monopoly; refusals to deal at 
TELRIC prices do not. 
There is a contradiction in such reasoning. TELRIC prices, at least in 
theory, provide an incumbent phone company, like Verizon, a competitive 
return on investment. 112 Similarly, if there is no monopoly, retail prices 
provide only a competitive return on investment. Thus, if an upstream 
monopolist refuses to deal in a competitive (or regulated) downstream market, 
this indicates nothing about monopoly power in the upstream market. 
Refusals to deal in either a natural retail market or a regulated wholesale 
market shed the same light (or lack of light) on anticompetitive intent. The 
Court rushed to the conclusion that the refusals to deal at market-set retail 
levels reveal much about the existence of antitrust injury-but refusals to deal 
at regulatory rates (designed to mimic a competitive market) do not. 
In other words, the question is not, as the Supreme Court would have it, 
at what price, wholesale or retail, TELRIC or non-TELRIC, the putative 
monopolist refuses to deal. The question is what the putative monopolist 
gains by refusing. If Verizon could obtain more monopoly rents from end-
users by refusing to interconnect with competitors-regardless of what 
competitors paid, its actions would be potentially anticompetitive. Thus, the 
Court's proposed "motive" rule for ferreting out anticompetitive, illegal 
refusals to deal from legal refusals to deal has limited bite. The real question 
112. See DAVID M. MANDY & WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, DYNAMIC 
PRICING AND INVESTMENT FROM STATIC PROXY MODELS 38 (Office of Strategic Planning & Policy 
Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 30, 2003). 
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is whether refusing to deal permits or facilitates the receipt of monopoly rents, 
and it is to that question the next section will turn next. 
As a final peculiarity, the Court's analysis simply ignores network 
effects.113 In network industries, as has been pointed out countless numbers 
of times, interconnection provides positive externalities. I 14 Larger networks 
are desirable and valuable because they allow end-users to make and receive 
calls to and from more individuals. Ceteris paribus, profit-maximizing 
networks, like Verizon, would want to interconnect with as many networks as 
possible because every interconnection provides Verizon with a larger, more 
valuable calling universe. 
Verizon might counter that the cost of interconnection is greater than its 
benefit-thus it would have no incentive to interconnect. Typically, that is the 
argument phone companies use for refusing to connect with all possible 
subscribers, as the marginal network benefit is less than the marginal network 
cost. However, under the 1996 Act, Verizon is being paid at TELRIC rates for 
interconnection. Thus, it is hard to see why a rational firm would refuse 
interconnection, unless TELRIC prices are not adequately compensatory. The 
Court hints that this might be the case, but its own precedent precludes it from 
doing any more than hinting. It has already ruled in Verizon v. FCC that 
TELRIC is a reasonable cost-recovery mechanism under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. I 15 
ill. VERTICAL FORECLOSURE, VERTICAL INTEGRATION, AND REFUSALS TO 
INTERCONNECT 
The question the Court never answered in Trinko is whether and how a 
refusal to deal-at either TELRIC rates or wholesale rates--can diminish total 
social welfare. In other words, is it possible that the Baby Bells are engaging 
in a strategy of vertical foreclosure by refusing to connect in an effort to 
enhance monopoly rents? Vertical foreclosure can occur when a firm controls 
a resource that is necessary, say access to the entire local telephone network, 
as do the Baby Bells, to a potentially downstream industry, say providing 
telephone service to consumers. This resource can be denied in order to 
increase the monopolist's profits-not as the Trinko opinion would to reduce 
113. See generally Oz SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 13-16 (200 I ) (describing in 
basic tenns the concept of network externalities). 
114. Id. at 18-24. 
liS. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 496 (2002). 
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the monopolist's profit with the hope that lower prices would drive possible 
competition from the market. 
The relationship between vertical foreclosure and the refusal to deal 
doctrine has long been recognized. Areeda and Turner say that 
it is hard to conceive of an antitrust rationale for enforcing a duty to deal that does not 
involve some kind of[ vertical] integration as between [for example] the pipeline and the 
gas shippers with whom it is dealing. If the pipeline refuses the plaintiff for lack of 
space, there is no antitrust problem at all. If it refuses the plaintiff merely for personal 
or other noneconomic reasons ... antitrust law is not apt. If it refuses the plaintiff 
because it has exclusive contracts with existing customers, antitrust may be apt. 1 16 
Vertical foreclosure can occur through a variety of mechanisms, including 
vertical integration-the process by which a monopolist incorporates into its 
business a vertically related market, e.g., Ford Motors integrating with 
Goodyear tires. That was the issue involved in Trinko. The monopoly at issue 
was V erizon' s access to the entire network. By vertically integrating with its 
retail services and refusing to interconnect (deal with) competitors, Verizon 
could-as argued below-reap full monopoly profits for its access. Efforts 
to stymie interconnection would constitute, therefore, efforts to maintain 
Verizon's ability to extract monopoly profits. 
Most antitrust scholars (along with recent court decisions) tend to see 
vertical integration benignly, however. Following the influential "Chicago 
School," they see few, if any, anticompetitive harms that vertical integration 
imposes. Rather, vertical integration simply reflects a firm's determination 
that certain transactions are more efficiently performed internally than through 
the market. 
The following section outlines the view that vertical integration poses no 
possibility for economic harms. The section then examines more recent 
economic thinking that takes a different view, seeing vertical integration as a 
strategy that protects monopoly rents under certain conditions. Finally, the 
section applies this economic thinking to Trinko as well as Aspen Skiing, 
which remains the refusal to deal doctrine's most complete explication. 
A. Vertical Integration and the Chicago School 
Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox, 117 a locus classicus ofthe "Chicago 
School" antitrust doctrine, attacks limits on vertical integration on two 
116. 3A AREEDA& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, , 171b. 
117. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
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grounds. First, vertical integration represents the market decision that certain 
transactions are more efficiently performed using a corporate command 
organization while others are more efficiently performed using market 
mechanisms. Ronald Coase first articulated this insight in The Theory of the 
Firm,118 which examines why particular transactions are performed within a 
firm and others outside the firm through market mechanisms. Or, put another 
way, why do firms have certain tasks performed by employees and 
"outsource" others to private contractors? Coase's answer is that there are 
different costs of inter-firm marketing compared to the costs of intra-firm 
command and control. Given the peculiarities of different modes of 
production, firms will integrate (and dis-integrate) in a fashion that maximizes 
the efficiency of their transactions. 1 19 
Bork uses the Coasian argument to show that anti competitive aims do not 
motivate vertical integration. Commenting on the infamous Brown Shoe 
decision,120 Bork points out the absurdity of holding illegal a merger between 
Brown Shoe, primarily a shoe manufacturer with four percent of the national 
market, and G.R. Kinney, a retailer (that also manufactured some of its 
product) with 0.5 percent. Brown Shoe reasoned that vertical integration 
operates like a tying clause, forcing Kinney to fill some of its retail needs with 
Brown's shoes and thereby foreclosing competition. Bork demolishes this 
argument against vertical integration by pointing out that while post-
acquisition, Kinney filled 7.9 percent of its needs from Brown Shoe, pre-
acquisition, Kinney provided twenty percent of its· own retail product-thus 
"foreclosing" competition to a greater degree before the merger. Further, 
forcing Kinney to sell shoes it would have otherwise bought on the market 
would be Brown Shoe's gain, but also presumably Kinney's loss-and, thus, 
it is unlikely that the merged entity would "force" shoes onto its retail 
business that it otherwise would not have bought. Rather, the decision to 
integrate, Bork suggests, is motivated by integration's added efficiency. 
Second, Bork argues that vertical integration generally does not result in 
changed pricing or output decisions, i.e., social welfare loss. His primary 
argument is a form of the single monopoly rent theorem-"a monopolist has 
118. Coase, supra note 25. 
119. Recent scholarship on network access and vertical integration has repeated the claim that the 
Coasian theory of the finn, as embodied in the "new institutional economics," supports the notion that the 
"monopolist has an incentive to be a good steward of the applications sector for its platfonn and thus better 
captures the argument for laissez-faire vertical policies." Farrell & Weiser, supra note 67, at 104. While 
Farrell and Weiser concede the bargaining problems, they do not discuss the Rey and Tirole argument, see 
infra text accompanying notes 129-34. 
120. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
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no ineentive to gain a second monopoly that is vertically related to the first, 
because there is no additional monopoly profit to be taken.,,121 The argument 
is intuitive and very powerful. Assume that there is a copper monopolist who 
sells ingots to a copper pot maker. According to the then-current view of 
antitrust, the copper ingot monopolist would wish to "extend" or "leverage" 
its monopoly from the ingot market to the copper pot market. If it vertically 
integrated into the retail copper pot market, it could use its ingot monopoly to 
drive out the other copper pot retailers and reign supreme in both markets. 
What Bork et al. point out, however, is that the demand for copper 
remains the same whether or not the ingot monopolist is integrated with the 
copper pot retailers. There is a quantity/price for a particular good that will 
maximize the monopolist's profits, and this quantity/price point is identical in 
both the integrated and non-integrated world. Thus, the integrated monopolist 
will not further raise prices or capture more rents. There is only one 
monopoly rent for copper pots, and integration does not affect whether or not 
it is captured.122 
It is essential to remember the historical context ofBork and the Chicago 
school in order to realize the limits to their argument. They wrote against 
what is known as the "Harvard School" of industrial organization that 
forwarded the theory that vertical integration does hurt consumers-in ways 
adumbrated above in the discussion of the Brown Shoe case. A monopolist 
could vertically integrate in an upstream market, limit supplies to the 
monopolist's rivals, raise their costs, make them uncompetitive, and thereby 
allow the leveraging monopolist to expand into the adjacent markets. 
According to advocates of this theory, firms with remarkably small market 
shares employ such anti competitive strategies as the 1968 DOJ Merger 
Guidelines indicate. 123 
Given the small market shares in adjacent markets that the Harvard 
School maintained could allow foreclosure, the Chicago critics were no doubt 
correct in their claims that vertical foreclosure is rarely a realistic strategy for 
leveraging a monopoly. It seems unlikely that a strategy of limiting supply in 
an attempt to foreclose competitors would be successful or even attempted. 
Further, as Bork and the single monopoly rent theorem would point out, it 
would rarely be desirable, as the putative monopolist could not reap a second 
monopoly in the adjacent market. 
121. BORK, supra note 117, at 229. 
122. [d. at 229-35. 
123. See U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 8-13, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atrlhmerger/l1247.htrn (last visited Mar. 1,2005). 
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Yet, the Chicago School approach does not necessarily provide knock-
down arguments against regulatory interference in communications. Today, 
the entire debate about communication regulation and open access involves 
firms with market power in adjacent markets. Unlike the Chicago 
School-which was addressing limits on mergers-current debates in 
telecommunications are about opening up existing vertically integrated 
monopolies. 124 The Baby Bells have a de facto monopoly in the local 
exchange and also provide retail service. The cable companies have 
monopolies on cable service-and significant market power in programming 
and Internet access. 125 As discussed below, foreclosure strategies may not be 
motivated by, as Bork believes, "the acquisition by a monopolist of a second 
vertically-related monopoly.,,126 Rather, the motive may be to protect an 
existing monopoly as discussed more fully in the next section. 
Further, Bork's Coasianltransaction cost economics argument-that the 
market will dictate the efficient degree of vertical integration-does not 
necessarily apply to cable systems and the incumbent telephone monopolists. 
A free market--one that decides which transactions are best performed within 
a firm and those best performed without-has not created their vertical 
structure. Rather, decades of intrusive government regulation-some of the 
most intrusive ever imposed in peacetime United States-have determined 
their structure.127 The deregulatory solution is not necessarily to loosen the 
bonds of these unnatural corporate creatures and let them roam the earth 
free-rather deregulation might require, as discussed in Section IV, the policy 
maker to decide how and on what terms competitors must have access to the 
incumbent monopolists' networks. 
Yet, before one decides how best (if at all) to mandate access, the 
question of whether there is an economic case for mandating access must be 
answered first. Under what conditions is it likely that a cable operator will 
foreclose access to a competing, non-affiliated programmer or internet service 
provider? Or, under what conditions is it likely that an incumbent telephone 
monopolist will foreclose against a competitor telephone service? Or, under 
124. The debates in telecommunications center around the incumbent monopolist's duty to 
interconnect with local competitors, the CLECs, and competitors in vertically adjacent markets, like ISPs. 
125. Industrial Analysis Division, Wireless Competition Bureau, Local Telephone Competition: 
Status as of December 31, 2003 (June 2004); see also UBS Investment Research, Wireline Postgame 
Analysis (June 2004) (on file with author). 
126. BORK, supra note 117, at 256. 
127. See generally BROCK, supra note 67; see also STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY 137-221 (200 I ) (describing federal regulatory authority and local 
franchising regulation of cable systems). 
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what conditions would a cable broadband service or telephone DSL service 
foreclose against a competitor ISP service? 
B. Rey and Tirole on Vertical Foreclosure 
Economists have long recognized conditions under which the single 
monopoly rent theorem will not hold, for instance, Krattenmaker, Scheff man, 
and Salop's famous "raising rivals costs" argument. 128 If, through control of 
a vital input (also known as an "essential facility"), a firm can raise its rivals' 
costs above the firm's own, rivals will have to raise their prices to consumers. 
This gives the monopolist firm the ability to raise its prices to supra-
competitive levels-at least to levels near its rivals' inflated prices. Thus, 
efforts to resist interconnection could be part of an effort by the Baby Bells to 
raise their CLECs' costs. This would raise prices to CLEC customers, 
protecting the Baby Bells' ability to charge its customers monopoly prices. 
Beyond shirking their regulatory mandates to interconnect, incumbents' 
flat refusals to interconnect also could be seen as part of an effort to raise 
rivals' costs. Plain refusal is a type of vertical foreclosure that can be seen as 
a sort of extreme example of raising rivals' costs. By refusing 
interconnection, the only way rivals could compete would be by completely 
replicating the ILECs' networks, an effort of prohibitive cost. Of course, it is 
impossible to identify a network monopolist's precise motivation for refusing 
interconnection, but it is true that for decades AT&T fought interconnection 
of any kind. It is at least conceivable that its behavior was an effort to 
maintain its monopoly.129 
In recent work, Rey and Tirole provide an excellent summary of the 
current thinking about vertical foreclosure and make their own important 
contributions. 13o Rather than seeing vertical integration as an effort to expand 
a monopoly, they conceive of it as a strategy to protect an existing monopoly. 
A monopolist will engage in exclusionary behavior not in an effort to expand 
128. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs 
To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 234-62 (1986); see also Krattenmaker et aI., supra note 
15, at 234 (citing United Statesv. Terminal RR Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912». Economists have pointed 
out numerous other situations in which the single monopoly rent theorem does not hold. Janusz A. Ordover 
& Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 
8 (1981). 
129. As an historical fact, telephone monopolists have fought interconnection in numerous instances. 
For instance, AT&T fought long-distance interconnection, radiophone interconnection, and even customer 
premise equipment interconnection. See BROCK, supra note 67, at 92-93, 112, 149. 
130. Rey & Tirole, supra note 11. 
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its monopoly but in an effort to continue receiving rents in an existing 
monopoly or, as Rey and Tirole say, "[t]he reconciliation of the foreclosure 
doctrine and the Chicago School critique is based on the observation that an 
upstream monopolist in general cannot fully exert its monopoly power without 
engaging in exclusionary practices.,,131 
Rey and Tirole analogize the incumbent monopolist to an "essential 
facility" or "bottleneck" to the owner of a patent. The patent holder can only 
profitably license its patent if it can credibly promise that it will not "flood the 
market with licenses" thereby allowing the competitive market to dissipate all 
monopoly rents the patent confers. Thus, the purchaser of the patent license 
desires a commitment from the patent holder to limit the number of licenses 
granted. On the other hand, once the patent-holder has sold licenses, it has the 
incentive to sell more. The issue is timing. While it may not have a motive 
to license to numerous parties before it sells to any licensee (because the value 
of the license would be less), once the license is sold, the patent holder does 
have an incentive to license again, particularly in secret. 132 
One way to eliminate this bargaining problem is, therefore, to integrate 
vertically. A phone company's desire to continue to reap monopoly profits 
from access to its network could possibly compel it to integrate with retail 
service-and then foreclose competitors by refusing to sell them access. 
Similarly, a cable company with a monopoly in the provision of video 
programming and broadband access would foreclose a video-programming 
provider seeking to distribute via the Internet. 
Rey and Tirole develop numerous results using a sophisticated 
mathematical model to expand this initial insight. First, the more competitive 
the downstream market, the lower the bottleneck owner's ability to receive 
monopolist rents.133 The more buyers of the essential facility that exist, the 
greater the credibility problem, the greater the buyers' reluctance to pay full 
monopoly price, and the greater the downward pressure on price. 134 
Second, Rey and Tirole observe that if there is a vertically integrated 
monopolist and an inefficient substitute, the monopolist would want to limit 
the supply to its competitors so as not to undermine its monopoly-but it 
would be at a price and quantity that would make it more attractive than the 
price of the inefficient substitute. This implication also argues for placing the 
131. !d. at 3. 
132. !d. at 3-6. 
133. Id. at 15,38. 
134. Id. at 25. 
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monopolist upstream as it creates a downstream stage of competition that 
"eliminates inferior substitutes.,,135 
These considerations lead Rey and Tirole to support common carrier 
policy-requiring the bottleneck holder to interconnect with and/or accept the 
traffic of other networks. They have numerous caveats to this prescription-
including a rule that non-discrimination in access price will "have the perverse 
effect of restoring the monopoly power that they are supposed to fight.,,136 
Yet, at the very least, their analysis suggests that (i) foreclosure is not, as the 
Chicago School would have it, an inconsequential problem and, consequently, 
(ii) vertical integration may be a strategy that bottleneck owners, e.g. 
telephone and cable companies, use to maintain or enhance monopoly rents, 
and (iii) some type of common carrier policy may be warranted. 
C. Application to Trinko 
Applying theory to practice, it seems at least possible that V erizon' s 
refusal to interconnect, or its resistance to interconnection both in the business 
and legal context, could be an effort to maintain its monopoly rents. The 
following section examines the test the Supreme Court applies and shows why 
it is lacking. Then, assuming that, in theory, refusals to interconnect could 
constitute anticompetitive behavior, this section looks for whether there is a 
workable test to put the theory into practice. 
1. The Trinko Test for Refusal to Deal 
The Court's test essentially states that a refusal to deal constitutes 
anticompetitive behavior if the putative monopolist intends to drive out 
competitors by enduring the profit loss from not dealing with competitors in 
the hope that the competitors will desist in their efforts to enter the 
monopolist's market. As "proxies" for this intent, the Court asks whether the 
putative monopolist ever sold the good in question, whether the rates are 
natural retail rates or regulatory cost-based rates, and whether the monopolist 
had not engaged in a course of dealing in wholesale access until forced to by 
regulation. 137 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 12. 
137. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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The Court would appear to assume that a good sold pursuant to regulation 
is somehow unnatural or, at least, not profitable. Refusals to sell such a good 
are not indicia of anti competitive intention. Instead, anticompetitive intent is 
only revealed from a refusal to sell goods that were at one time sold under 
market conditions and, therefore, presumed to be profitable. The Court 
implies, therefore, that a good sold pursuant to regulation is not sold for profit, 
and, therefore, a firm is justified in its refusal (at least from an economic 
perspective). 
Indeed, it is not clear that any firm would sell goods at a pure cost-based 
rate. Of course, as a factual matter, whether the FCC's cost-based rates 
(formed under the rubric, total element long range incremental costing or 
"TELRlC") constitute adequate compensation is a debatable question. 
According to its supporters, TELRlC mimics the price a competitive market 
would bring about-as a general principle, competitive markets force prices 
to incremental cost. Its detractors maintain that TELRlC produces 
unrealistically low rates because it does not allow firms to recover their fixed 
and sunk costs through some sort of average cost methodology. Scholars and 
partisans, economists and lawyers take both sides. 138 The adequacy of 
TELRlC, however, is something to which the Court has already spoken, ruling 
that it is a reasonable costing methodology. 139 
Assuming that TELRlC allows for some profit, the Court's argument 
against applying the refusal to deal doctrines to goods provided pursuant to 
regulation lacks bite. Presumably, the Baby Bells could make some profit 
from selling under TELRlC rates, but chose not to do so. Whether this might 
constitute an antitrust violation is a question to which we now turn. 
2. Antitrust Violations: From Theory to Test 
Typically, the accrual of monopoly rents of and by themselves does not 
make an antitrust violation. The "harm" of monopoly rents that industry 
concentration can sometimes cause must be balanced against the benefits of 
more efficient production. An often-used schemata for horizontal mergers 
138. The ''TELRIC debate" is a long battle with economist and lawyer partisans on both sides. 
Compare Jerry A. Hausman & 1. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory 
Unbundling o/Telecommunications Networks, I 09 YALE L.J. 417 (1999), with David Gable & David I. 
Rosenbaum, Who's Taking Whom: Some Comments and Evidence on the Constitutionality o/TELRIC, 
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 239 (2000). 
139. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 539 (2002). 
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invites the judge to balance the harms and benefits of horizontal integration 
to determine whether consumers might benefit from a given merger. 140 
Similarly, the refusal to deal doctrine presents the judge with competing 
interests: on one hand, as elaborated above, refusals to deal can enable firms 
to reap monopoly rents. By denying a needed input to competitors, a firm can 
raise its rivals' costs and allow it the "room" to charge supra-competitive 
prices, which raises consumer prices and potentially lowers net social welfare. 
Thus, once a firm has invested in some resource of infrastructure, the efficient 
result would be to share such resource at marginal costs with all consumers 
and rivals. Or, as Professor Einar Elhauge would say, "failing to share with 
rivals the property that confers monopoly power will almost always look 
inefficient from this purely ex post perspective.,,141 On the other hand, 
permitting firms to retain monopoly rents encourages greater investment. If 
firms expect a greater return, they will invest more. Or, as Elhauge says, "it 
is precisely the prospect of being able to exclude rivals from one's property 
and charge a price above the marginal cost of using it that is necessary to 
encourage the prior investments that created the property.,,142 
A test that requires a firm to deal in all of its valuable goods would 
severely limit innovation; on the other hand, absent a Schumpeterian faith in 
markets, allowing monopolists to foreclose in all instances could have 
deleterious allocative effects and, at least according to Lemley, Lessig, and 
Frischmann, deleterious dynamic effects as well. 143 
Elhauge suggests an interesting test for distinguishing between "good" 
and "bad" refusals to deal. He ar;gues that if a firm has already set a price for 
a good, it can be assumed that such price adequately compensates-the price 
is (by definition) adequate to provide sufficient incentive to the firm (or the 
firm would not have produced the good). If a firm, therefore, refuses to sell 
such a good to rivals in a discriminatory fashion, such a refusal could have 
allocative effects-but not dynamic. Thus, one could state as a rule that 
discriminatory refusals to deal to rivals can be condemned as anti-competitive 
and in violation of the antitrust statutes. Elhauge claims that virtually every 
Supreme Court case dealing with refusals to deal involve such discriminatory 
refusals. 144 
140. BORK, supra note 117, at 102-29. 
141. Elhauge, supra note 78, at 289. 
142. Id. 
143. See Lemley & Lessig, End-fo-End, supra note 10, at 945. 
144. E1hauge, supra note 78, at 309. 
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Elhauge's test, however, is quite static and perhaps fails to account for 
dynamic pricing decisions. A firm may view its investment as an option to 
experiment with different pricing schemes-sometimes dealing, sometimes 
refusing to deal to recover investment, or other times, refusing to deal with the 
anti competitive motivation. A firm-by changing its policy/deal strategy-
may simply be experimenting, not engaging in discriminatory pricing. 
Elhauge's test fails to account for this possibility. 
Elhauge bases his claim on the notion that "ex post [allocative] 
efficiencies of excluding rivals [cannot] suffice to require dealing with rivals 
as a matter of antitrust law, [for if] it did, then social desirable investments 
necessary to make or maintain monopoly power would never be made."145 In 
other words, it is the siren allure of monopoly profits that provides adequate 
incentives to invest. But, is that really true? As suggested above, a firm will 
invest if the expected return is greater than its opportunity costs. In other 
words, a firm will invest in a project ifthe expected return is better than any 
other possible return available to it. Notice, this does not mean that the firm 
will only invest if it receives monopoly profits or will invest if it simply 
receives a competitive rate. Rather, determinations of whether a firm would 
invest must be particularized. This would suggest that an alternate test for 
distinguishing between "good" and "bad" refusals to deal is whether, given a 
monopolist's opportunity costs, monopoly profits are necessary to encourage 
investment. 
Applying this test to vertical foreclosure in the Aspen Skiing case 
produces interesting results. Recall that the case involved two companies that 
dominated the ski areas in Aspen, Colorado, Aspen Skiing and Aspen 
Highlands, the former controlling three mountains and the latter one mountain. 
Aspen Skiing at one time sold joint passes with Aspen Highlands, but then 
backed out of the arrangement. Under this analysis, the retail product at issue 
was a multi-mountain pass in Aspen, Colorado. Aspen Skiing, as owner of 
three of the four mountains, possessed the "essential facility" or "monopoly 
resource" for such a product, i.e., as Aspen Highlands only owned one 
mountain, it could hardly sell multi-mountain passes without cooperation with 
Aspen Highlands. Under the Rey and Tirole model, the question is what 
strategies Aspen Skiing would adopt to allow it to reap monopoly rent from 
its resources. 
There are numerous strategies firms can adopt to maintain their 
monopolies in the face of the Coasian conjecture. One strategy would be to 
145. [d. at 305. 
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require Aspen Highlands to fork over a larger sale of the joint ticket returns 
in some type of exclusive contract. (Given that Aspen Skiing was the only 
multi-mountain operator in Aspen and Aspen Highlands the only competitor, 
any such contract would be exclusive.) It could receive its monopoly profits 
from the price that Aspen Highlands paid for the privilege to market multi-
mountain passes. Yet, Aspen Skiing did not choose this approach. This 
seems odd because, presumably, it could have commanded monopoly profits 
from tough negotiation with Aspen Highlands over the terms of the joint 
ticket. On the other hand, Aspen Highlands was apparently motivated by the 
desire to control all the mountains in Aspen. 146 
Instead, therefore, it chose to gamer its rents directly from consumers by 
"vertically integrating" in a sense. Aspen Skiing refused to sell Aspen 
Highlands such tickets even at retail price and provided all marketing of 
multi-mountain passes itself. The Trinko Court found this issue to be highly 
probative of anticompetitive intent. 147 Under the Elhauge discriminatory 
refusals against rivals test, such refusals would clearly be antitrust violations 
because retail prices obviously allow for a sufficient return on investment. A 
refusal to sell at retail would indicate, therefore, a strategy to foreclose 
competitors and possibly protect monopoly rents. 
Under the test advocated here, a similar result would occur. The test 
would be whether the tickets sold to Aspen Highlands covered Aspen Skiing's 
opportunity costs. Given that Aspen Skiing refused to sell the tickets at retail, 
and presumably retail prices covered Aspen Skiing's opportunity costs, then 
the refusal could have permitted Aspen Skiing to charge supra-competitive 
prices for its multi-mountain tickets. 148 
This test advocated here is admittedly much more difficult to administer 
than Elhauge's discriminatory refusals test. Indeed, given the difficulties and 
vagaries of calculating opportunity costs, it may be impossible to use. On the 
other hand, for vertically integrated industries in which certain goods are sold 
to no one, the test may be the only one available. In other words, if a firm 
retains its monopoly profits for a particular good by vertically integrating and 
never sells the monopoly good as a retail product, then one could never 
146. Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 50, at 1210. 
147. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,409 
(2004). 
148. Of course, Aspen Skiing's opportunity costs would include foregone revenue generated from 
refusing to deal and thereby increasing market share. The test advocated would exclude these costs-
indeed, that is arguably the purpose of the antitrust laws-to exclude certain market size-based 
opportunities. 
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detennine whether it was being discriminatory 10 its refusing to deal. 
Elhauge's test would not be helpful. 
IV. JUDICIAL REMEDIES: INSTITUTIONS AND INTERCONNECTION 
Even if one were to establish a coherent justification for the refusal to 
deal doctrine, one is sti11left with the question of what remedy courts should 
and can effectively provide. The Trinko Court began its analysis with this 
concern, stating, "We have been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions 
[to the general rule that businesses may deal or refuse to deal with whomever 
they wish], because of the uncertain virtue offorced sharing and the difficulty 
of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.,,149 
This concern took up much of the Trinko opinion as the Court dilated on the 
difficulties of administering a remedial program of access and its uselessness 
in light ofthe FCC's existing scheme of access. 150 The court expressed doubts 
about the efficacy of judicial intervention, stating, "Against the slight benefits 
of antitrust intervention here, we must weigh a realistic assessment of its 
costs," and it feared that "[a]llegations of violations of § 2S1(c)(3) duties are 
difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are highly 
technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous .... "151 
Commentators overwhelmingly agree the inability or difficulty in crafting a 
judicial remedy, i. e., a regime of access or terms and conditions for dealing in 
the refused good, renders the refusal to deal doctrine generally an undesirable 
tool for antitrust policy.152 
A quick and easy response to this problem is that, as the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized in Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko v. Bell Atlantic CO.,153 there is a difference between damages and 
149. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004). 
ISO. [d. at 411-16. 
lSI. [d. 
152. See 3A AREEDA& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 'U 774e, at 224 (criticizing the doctrine because 
it forces courts to deal with pricing issues that "courts are not well equipped to deal with" and courts cannot 
function as "price control agencies"); Areeda, supra note 43, at 853 (''No court should impose a duty to deal 
that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremedial 
by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic 
of a regulatory agency."); Lipsky & Sidak, supra note SO, at 1232 ("The mandating of access to network 
only begins the regulator'S task. "); Robinson, supra note 42, at 1216 ("Antitrust commentators are alert to 
the difficulty of determining the appropriate terms of access and for that reason have chastised courts for 
capriciously imposing the duty in the first place."). 
153. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Co., 305 F.3d 89, 111-13 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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injunctive relief. While "injunctive relief in this area may have ramifications 
that require particular judicial restraint,"154 the Second Circuit realized that 
damages would not require courts to oversee interconnection. ISS Rather, given 
the Federal Communication Commission's and state utility commission's less 
than stellar record on enforcement and given that the Trinko complaint arose 
out ofVerizon's alleged failure to observe its interconnection obligations in 
a good-faith manner, monetary damages could simply act as a spur to 
encourage good regulatory behavior by the incumbents. Further, as the 
Second Circuit points out, courts are quite capable of calculating damages so 
that the "antitrust laws [would] supplement the regulatory scheme.,,156 
A further, more cynical argument can be offered. The 1996 
Telecommunications Act, which created competitive local telephony, was the 
result of a struggle between the Baby Bells and AT&T over the terms and 
conditions under which the local markets would open to competition and the 
long-distance market would open to the Baby Bells. Most observers believe 
AT&T lost this struggle, at least on the congressional level. 157 In any case, 
institutional issues were a significant feature in this struggle in which 
Congress had to compromise between the claims of AT&T and the Baby 
Bells. For instance, the Baby Bells sought Federal Communications 
Commission oversight for their entry into long distance on the presumption 
that the Commission would be relatively lax while AT&T sought Department 
of Justice oversight on the presumption that it would be more stringent. Thus, 
allowing the FCC and antitrust dual oversight represents a congressional 
decision (or deal) that AT&T should have a particular arrow in its quiver to 
fight the continuing regulatory battles with the Baby Bells. The Trinko 
decision disrupted this deal. 
Beyond whether monetary damages are possible or whether courts should 
respect congressional deals is a more basic question: was the Trinko Court (as 
well as most commentators) correct in the claim that courts are incapable of 
administering a program of access? Or, to put the question slightly more 
accurately, are agencies an eminently preferable forum to create and 
154. ld. at 111. 
ISS. ld. at 111-12. 
156. ld. at 112-13. 
157. Stephanie N. Mehta, How 10 Get Broadband Moving Again Tech Companies Want Washington 
to Break the Broadband Traffic Jam by Helping Old-World. Old-Geezer Telcos. Good Luck, FORTUNE 
144, at 3 (2001) ("According to Scott Cleland, principal at the Precursor Group, a leading 
telecommunications consulting firm, the Bells won the Act in Congress; the long-distance companies won 
its implementation at the FCC."); David Aistrom, Passing the 1996 TelecomAct, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
REVIEW (Jan. I, 1997). 
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adjudicate forced access regimes? Conventional wisdom holds this to be the 
case, butthere does not seem to be any immediately apparent justification for 
this belief. 
On the other hand, the Coasian-W illiamsonian theory of the firm (and 
transaction cost economics which is the theory's modem standard bearery s8 
would predict that if a transaction is simple enough, i. e., involves no long term 
relationships with sunk costs, complicated coordination, or specialized 
knowledge and expertise, such transactions have low governance costs. They 
can be most efficiently performed in the market between firms. 1S9 Applying 
this insight to networks, interconnection can be mandated between different 
firms if its terms are sufficiently simple-regardless of whether courts or 
agencies do the mandating. Judge Greene succeeded because the engineering, 
economics, and law of long-distance/local interconnection were (relatively) 
simple. 160 Regulatory interconnection between the CLECs and Baby Bells has 
failed because the 1996 Act and the FCC could not create a simple 
interconnection regime suitable for a competitive market. 
Transaction cost economics has been used in the past as a shield to 
support vertical integration. Scholars and advocates used it to show "that 
previously suspect vertical arrangements [like certain tying claims and 
foreclosure claims based on small market shares] often could be explained as 
contractual and organizational responses motivated by a desire to reduce the 
cost oftransacting.,,161 Yet, transaction cost economics can also be used as a 
regulatory sword to guide mandated open access. Where monopoly power is 
present in network industries, transaction cost economics can help 
policymakers decide the best ways to mandate interconnection and/or access. 
Both judges and agencies have strengths and weaknesses in setting 
interconnection policy. Judges have limited time and information to deal with 
complex issues but are more immune to political pressure and their orders are 
more final, providing greater business certainty and more stable property 
rights. On the other hand, agencies can devote more resources to technical 
158. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 68, at 118-230. 
159. See Coase, supra note 25, at 37-52. 
160. Of course, local-long distance interconnection intercarrier payments were, in fact, complicated 
by the complex scheme by which long distance service subsidized local. See BROCK, supra note 67, 
135-80. However, this scheme was only necessary to maintain the existing program of local service 
subsidization. Such schemes have little role to play necessarily in any regime of competitive access. 
161. Paul L. Joskow, The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1991); see also Christopher Weare, Interconnections: A 
Contractual Analysis of the Regulation of Bottleneck Telephone Monopolies, in INDUSTRIAL AND 
CORPORATE CHANGE 5, at 985 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996). 
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analysis but are susceptible to political capture, i.e., the interests of the 
regulated firms and/or political expedience often guide their decisions-and, 
as evidenced by the 1996 Act regulation, they cannot provide finality, 
clouding business certainty.162 
A. An Historical Perspective to Judicially Mandated Interconnection 
As argued above, Trinko's motivating factor was pragmatic, the concern 
that courts cannot create workable interconnection regimes, and, therefore, 
this job should be left to regulators. This concern has a remarkable and 
unacknowledged historical parallel to the last time there was vibrant 
competition in local telephony in the United States-in the early part of the 
twentieth century after the expiration of the original Bell patent and before the 
establishment of the second AT&T monopoly and its concomitant regulation 
starting with the Kingsbury Agreement of 1916.163 During this competitive 
period, courts refused to judicially mandate interconnection between carriers 
under claims that the common law duties of common carriers (which 
telephone companies are) require interconnection. The competitors argued 
that common carriers, like trains, ferryboats, toll roads, and bailers, have an 
obligation to provide service, i. e., interconnection, to all, including 
competitors. 164 
Courts agreed with this principle to the extent that all parties, whether 
business, private persons, or competitors, had a right to receive retail service 
from common carriers. 165 Thus, the Bell companies had to transmit messages 
162. The D.C. Circuit in its vacating of the Triennial Order expressed, in uncharacteristically frank 
tenns, exasperation at the FCC's inability to write legal rules after three attempts over an eight year period. 
See supra note 60. 
163. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. 1. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 4 7 U .S.C.); HARRy MACMEAL, THE STORY OF INDEPENDENT TELEPHONY 206 (1934). 
The Kingsbury Commitment required independent phone companies to pay ''tariffs'' to interconnect with 
Bell-affiliated long-distance services and thus constituted the first (of many) federally mandated 
interconnection regimes. For the definitive historical description of this period, see MILTON MUELLER, 
UNIVERSAL SERVICE (1999). The analysis in this section draws upon previous work. See Adam Candeub, 
Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE 1. REv. 369 (2004). 
164. See, e.g., Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-1920, 
34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340, 343 (1969); id. at 350. "Refusal to connect with independent telephone 
systems for long-distance telephone service afforded Bell a stronger means of curbing the independent 
movement. Since Bell was the pioneer in this field, its refusal to connect confined independent companies 
within the limits of the particular territories they served." Id. 
165. See, e.g., James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. 
COMM. 1.J. 225, 258 (2002) ("[T)he common law imposed no obligation on railroads (or other carriers) 
to interconnect with the lines of other carriers or to establish joint or through rates for services .... There 
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to competitors if competitors purchased telephone service from a Bell 
company. Indeed, it was often the legal duty-given telephone companies' 
status as common carriers-for one telephone company to call the central 
office of the other telephone company in order to inform its subscriber ofthe 
call and tell her to go to a public phone belonging to the first telephone 
company.166 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin described the process: 
Where there was a call over the Bell toll line for a resident of La Crosse who was a 
subscriber to the exchange of the local company, but not to that of the plaintiff, an 
operator in the local company's office was notified of such call by telephone. The 
operator then notified its subscriber ofthe call, and such subscriber could respond only 
to a Bell station or to a place where a Bell phone was in use ... the average waiting was 
half an hour. 167 
The court continued: 
The business of a telephone company is to transmit oral messages from one point to 
another, and for that purpose every patron, whether he is a subscriber or not, has the use 
of its line for the time being. That is the public use to which they are dedicated. Without 
the physical connection each subscriber to a Citizen's telephone is entitled to the same 
use of the complainant's lines that he would have with the physical connection; the 
difference being that with the lines connected he can talk from his own telephone, while 
without the connection he would be obliged to go to a public station of complainant 
company. 168 
The problem is (and was) that while a court can order that a regulated, 
established rate be charged to everyone-including competitors (like telegraph 
was no obligation to establish either a physical connection or a joint business operation."). 
166. Mich. State Tel. Co. v. Mich. R.R. Comm'n, 161 N.W. 240, 243 (Mich. 1916); Home Tel. Co. 
v. Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co., 139 S.W. 108, 112 (Mo. 1911); Home Tel. Co. v. People's Tel. & Tel. Co., 
141 S.W. 845, 848 (Tenn. 1911) ("[U]nder the common law [each telephone company] is independent of 
all other telephone companies, save for the duty to receive and forward to any point on its line messages 
received from such other company or companies .... "). 
167. Wis. Tel. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 156 N.W. 614, 616 (Wis. 1916); see also Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Anderson, 196 Fed. 699, 703 (E.D. Wash. 1912) ("[A]t common law each telephone company is 
independent of all other telephone companies, save for the duty to receive and forward to any point on its 
lines messages received from such other company or companies .... "); Mich. State Tel. Co., 161 N.W. at 
243. 
Id. 
The business of a telephone company is to transmit oral messages from one point to another, and 
for that purpose every patron, whether he is a subscriber or not, has the use of its lines for the being. 
That is the public use to which they are dedicated. Without the physical connection each subscriber 
to a Citizens' telephone is entitled to the same use of the complainant's lines that he would have 
with the physical connection. 
168. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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offices )--courts cannot see how to set the rates for interconnection between 
competitors. 169 Thus, the legal-technical problems faced by both the Trinko 
case and the early common carriage cases are identical-a competitor cannot 
economically interconnect with a Bell using only a retail line. It needs a 
bigger pipe. Judges in the early twentieth century and now justices in the 
early twenty-first century trembled at the thought of trying to answer this 
question; they simply could not imagine courts formulating rules for 
connection. 
But, is the notion of judicially mandated and supervised interconnection 
between carriers so utterly horrific? Telecommunication history suggests that 
courts can mandate interconnection effectively without bureaucratic 
oversight-perhaps more effectively than the FCC. For instance, competitive 
long distance started out with such a judicial order, Judge Greene's famed 
MF J that broke up the AT&T telephone monopoly into the local monopolists 
(the original seven "Baby Bells" now grown up into SBC, BellSouth, Verizon, 
and Qwest) and the competitive long-distance companies, AT&T, MCI, and 
Sprint. 170 While the price paid for interconnection between the competitive 
long-distance companies, like Mel and AT&T, was a matter of regulatory 
oversight,171 and endless regulatory and judicial wrangling persists to this 
day, 172 the physical question of interconnection was relatively straightforward. 
MCI and the other competitive long-distance companies were afforded points 
of presence (POPs of places at which the networks would physically connect) 
to which the Baby Bells had to provide connection. 
Further, while interconnection pricing tends to be a chronic regulatory 
headache, recent theories of interconnection suggest that regulators should not 
set prices. Under certain conditions, carriers should exchange traffic for 
free. 173 Such approaches to inter-carrier compensation could end the incessant 
169. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
170. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). Of course, the 
details of long distance competition and, most particularly, access charges were delegated to regulatory 
authority. On the other hand, the actual physical interconnection was not so difficult to achieve. 
171. That is putting it mildly. The access charge regime was (and remains to this day) a cause of 
endless regulatory wrangling. See BROCK, supra note 67, at 173-94. 
172. See Access Charge Reform, 15 F.C.C.R. 12962 (2000) (setting forth the most recent reform of 
the access charge regime). 
173. While hardly accepted universally, some economists are calling for interconnection without 
intercarrier payments. See JAY M. ATKINSON & CHRISTOPHER C. BARNEKOV, FED. COMMUNICATIONS 
COMM'N, A COMPETITIVELY NEUTRAL APPROACH TO NETWORK INTERCONNECTION (Office of Plans & 
Policy, Working Paper Series No. 34, 2000); Patrick DeGraba, Central Office Bill and Keep as a Unified 
Inter-Carrier Compensation Regime, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2002). 
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wrangling in Washington and the state utility commissions and would simplify 
the challenge to any judicially mandated scheme of interconnection. 
Finally, there are numerous network markets in which competitors 
routinely interconnect, such as the Internet backbone, wireless-to-wireless, and 
wireless-~o-wireline (for roaming charges). 174 Indeed, as the leading 
telecommunications historian Milton Mueller has shown, even AT&T, during 
the early days of competitive telephony, voluntarily interconnected, at times, 
with the independents, as did most independent telephone companies with the 
AT&T monopoly.175 The existence of non-regulated interconnection on a 
large scale suggests that interconnection can be possible on simple terms 
susceptible to court order. 
B. Transaction Cost Economics and Interconnection, or If Judge Greene 
Can Mandate Interconnection Successfully, Can't Other Judges? 
As a historical matter (and contrary to the Trinko Court), some types of 
mandated interconnection work and others do not-regardless of whether 
courts or agencies do the mandating. The remaining question is, therefore, 
how courts can separate instances in which judicially mandated 
interconnection will be an administrative disaster from those in which it will 
bring competition's sweet fruits to monopoly's desiccated plains. It has been 
suggested by numerous prominent economists that transaction cost economics 
can offer insight. 
The basic insight of transaction cost economics derives from Coase's 
seminal article, The Theory of the Firm.176 Coase asked a very basic 
question-why are firms shaped the way they are? In other words, why do 
firms perform some transactions internally through the hierarchical, command 
and control typical of most employment relationships while they perform 
others through the market? His answer was straightforward-some 
transactions are more cheaply done through the market, others are more 
cheaply done internally through hierarchical control. 
174. MICHAEL KENDE, FED. COMMUNICA nONS COMM'N, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING 
INTERNET BACKBONES 5 (Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper Series No. 32, 2000) (noting that 
"peering partners exchange traffic on a settlements-free basis"); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Y 00, 
Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 885 (2003). 
175. MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNNERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND 
MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 46-47 (1997). See also HUBER ET AL., 
FEDERAL TELECOM LAw § 2.4.1 (2d ed. 1999). 
176. See Coase, supra note 25, at 45-68. 
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Williamson has brought greater analytic precision to Coase's central 
insight.177 He re-formulated Coase's insight as a problem of agency and 
contract. Due to the fact that no contract can possibly anticipate every 
contingency, Williamson points out that some types of deals or purchases, due 
to their complexity, create problems of agency for their contracting parties. 
Contractual incompleteness permits situations in which actors can be put in 
vulnerable situations. 
For instance, consider a computer contractor working on a major project 
for a corporate customer. The contractor agrees to produce a large, 
complicated product: a computer and programming system. Because of the 
complexity of the product, there is significant ex ante cost in writing the 
contract. Because of the specialized nature of the product, there is significant 
ex post cost because the contractor will make significant investments to create 
the product but has limited ability to sell its product to anyone but that 
customer. The contractor, thus, is vulnerable to the corporate customer's 
opportunistic behavior. This behavior might include, for instance, the 
customer refusing to pay what was agreed upon-or, that the product will cost 
a lot more to create than expected-refusing to compensate the extra cost. 
Conversely, if the corporate customer pays up front to eliminate some of these 
risks, the customer will create a situation with a moral hazard for the 
contractor: the contractor has an incentive to shirk and not deliver the quality 
or quantity promised. Thus, the customer must expend the cost to monitor the 
contractor. 178 
In contrast, consider the purchase of gold ingots. From an ex ante 
perspective, the contract is simple and largely costless as the purchase is for 
a simple commodity with easily defined and verified attributes. From an ex 
post perspective, the seller, unlike the computer contractor, possesses a good 
that it can sell to anyone. Thus, if it has a contract to sell an ingot with a 
particular purchaser, the seller is not susceptible to any opportunistic behavior. 
If the purchaser refuses to pay the agreed upon amount, the seller can sell to 
someone else. Conversely, the purchaser knows what it is getting; gold is 
marked and easily tested. There is little need to worry about opportunism. 
Transaction cost economics predicts that the sale of gold ingots occurs in 
open markets, because the purchase of gold has low governance costs and few 
177. SeeG.P. Pisano, The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis, 3S ADMIN. SCIENCE 
Q. I S3 (1990) (discussing monitoring costs that result from joint research and development between and 
among pharmaceutical companies). 
178. See YJ. Bakos & E. Brynjolfsson, From Vendors to Partners: Information Technology and 
Incomplete Contracts, 3 J. ORG. COMPUTING 301-28 (\993). 
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agency 'problems. Each party entering into a contract to sell does not face 
large risks that one party will take advantage of the other. On the other hand, 
computer contracting is often performed in-house or often involves incredibly 
complex contracting with specific governance provisions. Transaction cost 
economics would suggest that the added administrative cost of running a 
hierarchical, in-hours operation is outweighed by the governance costs and 
risks such contracting would impose if performed on the open market. 
Numerous prominent scholars have applied this insight to 
telecommunications. For instance, Christopher Weare argues that higher 
levels of transaction cost complexity and uncertainty leads to increased 
regulatory cost. Thus, successful regulatory regimes will involve "low 
technology complexity and uncertainty. ,,179 Weare argues that CPE and long-
distance represent prime examples of deregulation that mandated 
interconnection with relatively stable, low-complexity technologies. 
Gerald Faulhauber, former FCC Chief Economist, also argues that 
transaction cost economics hold the key. ISO Faulhauber compares the 1996 
Act's effort to introduce competition to the Baby Bells with Judge Greene's 
court-ordered divestiture of AT&T into competitive long-distance companies 
and the still-monopolized Baby Bells pursuant to the Department of Justice's 
antitrust SUit. ISI He argues the latter was a success in bringing about 
competitive long-distance because it created a clear boundary between the 
local and long-distance markets. The court required equal access for all long-
distance companies and prescribed a relatively simple procedure with a 
relatively simple physical architecture by which long-distance companies 
could interconnect. This created a "low transaction cost" boundary through 
which the Baby Bells could interconnect with the competitive long-distance 
companies with minimal cooperation between the two. Finally, Judge Greene 
excluded the Baby Bells from competing in long-distance and thus denied 
them any possible motive to stymie interconnection with the long-distance 
companies. IS2 
In marked contrast, the 1996 Act created a very fuzzy boundary between 
the Baby Bells and their competitors. The physical features of interconnection 
are incredibly complex and continue to be controversial. IS3 Unlike the relative 
179. Weare, supra note 161, at 985. 
180. Faulhauber, supra note 24. 
181. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
182. Faulhauber, supra note 24, at 10. 
183. Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 
03-36, available al http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs -public/attachmatchlFCC-03-36A l.pdf(Aug. 21 , 2003). 
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simplicity oflong-distance interconnection, administering the UNEs involves 
close cooperation between Baby Bells and their competitors, and their precise 
physical (and virtual) contours continue to be debated as well as their pricing. 
In other words, the Act failed to provide a low transaction cost boundary. 
Further, the Act allows the entrants to compete with the incumbent 
monopolists in the same markets and (perhaps) the Baby Bells do have a 
motive to refuse or stymie interconnection. 184 
Thus, it seems plausible that the fears of the Trinko Court are simply 
misplaced. The question is not whether courts or administrative agencies are 
better "qualified" to mandate interconnection. The question is the type of 
interconnection they mandate-whether it creates a low transaction cost 
boundary and whether it has the appropriate industrial structure to foster 
competition. It would seem the legitimate job of courts to determine, given 
the industry and particular circumstances, whether such access and what kinds 
of access would be effective. 
CONCLUSION: How TO READ TRINKO 
In the myriad disputes involving interconnection, not simply in telephony 
but in network access disputes ranging from the cable systems to the 
electricity grids, advocates will claim that Trinko stands for the proposition 
that a refusal to interconnect-where there exists some regulatory regime 
governing interconnection--does not constitute an antitrust violation under 
any theory. The language ofthe opinion is ambiguous. At times, it states that 
Verizon refused to offer those network elements required under the Act, i. e., 
UNEs, suggesting a narrower reading. At other times, it states that Verizon 
refused to offer interconnection of any kind, i. e., refused to allow competitors 
or other parties to connect with it under any regimes-regulatory or 
contractual. 
If Trinko is read to hold that the antitrust laws cannot be used to require 
interconnection of any kind-that all interconnection issues start and end with 
the 1996 Act or other communications law and regulation-then Trinko 
arguably would insulate an incumbent monopolist from anticompetitive abuses 
that have a very real possibility of inflicting antitrust injury. Further, this 
reading potentially permits the incumbents to engage in foreclosure of a huge 
184. Faulhauber, in fact, marshals empirical support for this claim, comparing long-distance, 
intrastate interlata calls with long-distance, intrastate intralata calls. See Faulhauber, supra note 24, at 
83-85. 
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number of technologies that rely upon their networks-from wireless 
telephony to the Internet and WiFi. While under current regulation, Title II 
of the 1934 Communications Act's common carriage mandate would require 
interconnection,185 recent regulatory efforts may move newer technologies, 
like broadband, out of common carriage protections, thus making the 
likelihood of foreclosure greater. 186 
Despite the importance of specifying what types of interconnection are 
involved, Trinko is maddeningly vague. On one hand, the narrower 
interpretation-that only interconnection under the 1996 Act is involved-has 
support from the opinion's first paragraph which states, "[i]n this case we 
consider whether a complaint alleging breach of the incumbent's duty under 
the 1996 Act to share its network with competitors states a claim under § 2 of 
the Sherman ACt.,,187 The opinion quotes from the complaint stating that 
"Verizon had filled rivals' orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an 
anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers from becoming or remaining 
customers of competitive LECs.,,188 Trinko later describes its purpose as to 
decide whether "the activity of which respondent complains [presumably 
discriminatory order filling under the 1996 Act] violates preexisting antitrust 
standards." 189 Further, "V erizon' s reluctance to interconnect at cost-based rate 
of compensation available under § 2S1(c)(3) [a portion of the Act] tells us 
nothing about dreams about monopoly.,,190 
On the other hand, the opinion's language also supports a broad 
reading-that all antitrust claims involving refusals to interconnect are barred. 
The opinion states that the alleged antitrust injury consists of "Verizon['s] 
deni[al of] interconnection services to rivals in order to limit entry.,,191 In 
dismissing the court of appeal's argument that the Trinko complaint may also 
state a leveraging theory, the Court stated that "leveraging presupposes 
anti competitive conduct, which in this case could only be the refusal to deal 
185. See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). 
186. See High-Speed Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10, at 4812 (declining to impose an obligation 
of open access onto cable systems); Broadband Access NPRM, supra note 10, at 3019 (tentatively 
concluding to eliminate the Computer ill obligations on the Baby Bells to provide interconnection with 
advanced service providers, such as internet service providers); Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand 
X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) (affirming the conclusions of the Broadband Access NPRM). 
187. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 401 
(2004). 
188. Id. at 404. 
189. Id. at 407. 
190. !d. at 409. 
191. Id. at 407. 
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claim we have rejected." This suggests that the interconnection Trinko is 
talking about is broader than that required by the Act. Further, the complaint 
itself speaks in broad terms alleging that Bell Atlantic (Verizon' s predecessor) 
used its control over its physical wires to discriminate against the plaintiffs 
and does not allege a violation of the 1996 Act but rather alleges an injury 
under the Sherman Act and Communication Act of 1934-and the Court states 
that it responds "to whether the activity of which respondent complains 
violates pre-existing antitrust standards.,,192 
This article has argued that refusal to interconnect, whether or not under 
a regulatory regime, can result in anticompetitive harm. The Trinko opinion 
relied on a wooden doctrinal analysis and fears of judicially mandated 
interconnection to arrive at its conclusion. Its analysis simply ignored the 
possible economic impact of refusals to interconnect under either a market or 
regulatory regime. Further, its fears concerning judicially mandated 
interconnection were not based on historical experience or a large body of 
economic analysis. Trinko must be read narrowly. 
192. [d. at 409. 
